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Halaqa 49

Was the Islamic System Implemented in the Islamic State?

About this Halaqa

Full title: The System of Islam — Halaqa 49: Was the Islamic System Implemented in the Islamic State?

Lecturer: Sheikh Ahmad al-Qasas
Series: Commentary on The System of Islam
Date: 24 September 2018 — 14 Muharram 1440 AH

Video with subtitles

Full transcript

From the bookThe System of IslamSixth edition · 2001p. 53

Opening from The System of Islam

Did the Muslims implement Islam, or did they only embrace its creed while implementing other systems and laws? The answer to this question is that Muslims implemented Islam alone through all the ages from the arrival of Rasool Allah (saw) to Madinah until 1336 A.H i.e. 1918 C.E when the last Islamic State collapsed at the hands of colonialism. Its application was so comprehensive that it brought with it the greatest possible success.

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Has the Islamic system been implemented?

Peace be upon you and Allah’s mercy and blessings. Welcome, my brothers. In this new episode of your programme Halaqa Online, we remain within the book The System of Islam by Imam Taqi ad-Din an-Nabhani, reading and expanding on some of his ideas today. Our topic is of paramount importance.

Was the Islamic system ever implemented or was it not? These are claims we encounter in articles and books by Orientalists and their followers within the Islamic world—those influenced by Western culture—which assert that Islam, as a comprehensive system for life, society, and governance, was only applied during the time of the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace and his Rightly Guided Khaleefahs. Some even claim it was never implemented except in the era of the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace and the two Khaleefahs who succeeded him: Abu Bakr and Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with them both.

Naturally, the purpose of these claims is to suggest to Muslims that this system is merely theoretical and cannot be implemented, thereby making them despair of the idea of resuming the Islamic way of life by re-establishing the Islamic state that applies the Shari’ah of Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He. How accurate is this claim? Was Islam actually implemented or not? During which periods, and for how long, did its implementation continue in Islamic history? Was it confined to the era of the Rightly Guided Khaleefahs, or did it continue afterwards under the Umayyad, Abbasid and Ottoman Khilafahs, and under the sultanates and emirates that existed between these periods of Khilafah, and so forth?

We ask Allah for guidance so that we may determine which ruling system was applied in a given state. To do this, we must examine two key figures within it: the judge, who resolves disputes among people in courts according to an established legal framework and approved laws; and the ruler, who oversees the internal and external affairs of the people through a governing system and legislation that he himself adopts.

The Judiciary in Islamic History

As for the judiciary, what was the system adopted by judges throughout Islamic history from the time of the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace until the late period of the Ottoman Caliphate? It is well known to all who have read Islamic history with fairness and objectivity that the judiciary—from the era of the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace, through his Rightly Guided Khulafā’, then the Umayyads, followed by the Abbasids, and extending to the Ottoman Caliphate which fell about a century ago—never recognised any legal system other than Islamic Shari’ah. The Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace adjudicated between people and dispatched judges from among his Companions to the regions of the Islamic state, which during his time encompassed the Arabian Peninsula. His Rightly Guided Khulafā’ thereafter followed his method. It is entirely false that judicial rulings ever deviated from Islamic Shari’ah or Islamic jurisprudence toward any other laws or legal systems.

Whoever examines the full breadth of Islamic history will find that those who held judicial office throughout Islamic history were jurists who had studied the Shari’ah legal rulings and the rulings of fiqh. They settled every kind of dispute among people according to the Shari’ah of Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He. Islamic history never knew—never knew—a distinction between a Shari’ah court and a civil court, as exists in the judiciary of the Islamic world after the fall of the Islamic state.

Indeed, there were judges specialising in grievances; others specialised in disputes between individuals. Some may have focused on financial matters, while another branch was known as the hisbah judiciary, and so forth. This division of labour notwithstanding, all judges were jurists who ruled according to Islamic Shari’ah through Islamic jurisprudence. There has never been any recorded instance in Islamic history where legislation other than Islamic jurisprudence—or indeed any non-Islamic legal system—was applied.

It is well established that Muslims studied and translated numerous works from other nations and cultures. Despite translating philosophical texts to refute them, and despite rendering scientific treatises in physics, chemistry, medicine, engineering, and related fields, there exists no historical record of Muslims ever translating legal codes—whether Roman law, Persian law, or any other legislative system.

Muslims know that examining other nations’ legal systems yields no benefit. On one hand, it is impermissible for them to derive anything from such systems, since their entire legislation stems from the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger may Allah bless him and grant him peace—and what he was guided towards. On the other hand, they recognise that when engaging with other nations—particularly in calling them to Islam—the debate cannot centre on legal systems but must focus instead on creed.

If people abandon their creeds and embrace the Islamic creed, they automatically commit themselves to the Shari’ah of Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He, because Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He, says:

﴿ وَمَا كَانَ لِمُؤْمِنٍ وَلَا مُؤْمِنَةٍ إِذَا قَضَى ٱللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُۥٓ أَمْرًا أَن يَكُونَ لَهُمُ ٱلْخِيَرَةُ مِنْ أَمْرِهِمْ ﴾
‘It is not for a believing man or woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, to have any choice in their affair.’ [33:36]

Thus, throughout Islamic history, jurists knew no legislative texts other than the texts of Islamic legislation deduced from the Book and the Sunnah. Even in the late periods of Islamic history, they knew no other legislative texts. All the historical records therefore confirm that the jurists—the judges—ruled by the Shari’ah of Allah alone. Nothing existed within the Islamic judiciary except Islamic fiqh, which expresses the Islamic Shari’ah.

This remained the case until the final period of the Ottoman State. Anyone who now examines the preserved records of the Shari’ah courts of the Ottoman State in the Islamic world will find that all the judges ruled by the Shari’ah of Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He.

Yes, during the late Ottoman period, the Ottoman State began to be influenced by Western legal texts and to rely on fatwas when importing or drafting some laws. This occurred in the final period of the Ottoman State. Even then, however, they maintained the principle that it was impermissible to derive any law that contradicted the Islamic Shari’ah. They would take from Islamic fiqh what could correspond to Western laws and legislation. This was in the late period of the Ottoman State and is, of course, not the criterion for determining whether Islam was implemented throughout Islamic history.

Fields of Application of the State Systems

So, this pertains to the judiciary; however, as for what the ruler implements—what fields does the head of state apply the laws he adopts? It is known that the laws implemented by the ruler fall under the following branches: he applies systems and laws in governance, within the ruling system itself, in economics, and in social affairs—that is, in matters concerning the relationship between men and women, educational policy, and foreign policy. These are the five fields in which any law may be applied in any state. If we determine what systems the ruler implements across these fields, we will understand the system that was enforced in that particular state. Let us now examine each of these fields one by one.

The social system and personal status

When we first address the subject of the social system—or what is now referred to in contemporary states as personal status systems—we mean the regulations governing the relationship between men and women, including matters such as marriage, divorce, filiation, inheritance, and related issues.

In this field, there is universal agreement: since the time of the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace until the end of the Islamic state—and indeed even to this day—no system other than the Shari’ah has been applied by the Ummah. There was no marriage for Muslims except in accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah, as revealed in the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger. The legal rulings on marriage and divorce enforced within the Islamic state were those established by Islam itself. Even after secular systems were introduced in our countries, most legal frameworks in the Islamic world have retained only what is known as personal status laws from the Shari’ah. Consequently, marriage and divorce continue to be conducted exclusively according to the Islamic Shari’ah.

If we exclude certain countries such as Turkey and Tunisia, which adopted the secular kufr system in matters of marriage and divorce, as well as a few other states, then the system still adopted in this field throughout most of the Islamic world is the Islamic system: the Islamic social system that regulates the relationship between men and women in marriage, divorce, lineage, inheritance and so forth. There is therefore no dispute or debate about this.

The Economic System and the Treasury (Bayt al-Mal)

In the economic sphere, the Islamic state’s system was based on how it acquired and managed funds. Specifically, what concerned the state was how it collected revenue—how money was gathered—and what constituted the revenues of the Treasury (Bayt al-Mal), as it was then called; today, this might be referred to as the state treasury or public fund. The Islamic state’s system defined the sources of the Treasury (Bayt al-Mal) and its expenditures.

The Shari’ah specified particular revenues for the Islamic state, including Zakat, Kharaj, Ushur, Ghanimah, Fay’, public-property funds and so forth. We are not now enumerating them; this subject may have dedicated episodes of its own. These, then, were revenues prescribed by the Shari’ah for the Islamic state, and the Islamic state adhered to them. It is also well known that, if the revenues prescribed by the Shari’ah were insufficient, the Shari’ah permitted the ruler to take from the wealth of the affluent what was needed for the matters and interests of the Muslims on which the Islamic state was categorically obliged to spend. This was what the Islamic state adhered to.

Similarly, regarding expenditures, the Islamic state spent from the Treasury (Bayt al-Mal) only on what Islam obligated it to fund. In the case of Zakat, funds were allocated to its five designated categories as outlined in the Qur’an. Beyond this, the state expended resources on Jihad, military equipment, urban development, road construction, mosque building, and managing educational affairs for the people. These were mandatory expenditures prescribed by the Shari’ah, and the Islamic state fulfilled them accordingly.

Someone might argue: ‘Islamic historical records document instances where rulers imposed hardship on people in tax collection.’ Yes, there have been cases of misapplication by rulers—but this is not unique to Islam. The distinction lies between the system itself and how well—or poorly—it was implemented, whether it was circumvented, or how errors crept into its application.

If a ruler misapplies the system—spending funds somewhere beyond what is necessary, encroaching upon public property, or transgressing against people’s wealth by taking it and spending it on his palaces, as occurred frequently in Islamic history—this is not because that ruler adopted a system other than Islam or introduced an economic system other than Islam’s economic system. Rather, it is misapplication: at times, an assault by the ruler upon people’s wealth, and so forth.

This can occur within any ruling system. If today’s rulers embezzle public funds, engage in corruption, or take bribes, it would not be said that they have replaced the capitalist economic system with another—since the capitalist economic system is the one currently adopted in their country. Rather, such a ruler has violated this system through misapplication, exceeding its limits, or encroaching upon people’s wealth.

The violation of people’s wealth or transgression of legal rulings is not proof that the law was never implemented or that the state adopted a different system from Islamic law. Rather, it was the Islamic economic system that remained the one applied and adhered to.

Whenever Khaleefahs encountered new matters in which they sought guidance on how to proceed, they would summon a jurist from among the scholars. Some even adopted jurisprudential works composed by certain jurists—such as The Book of al-Kharaj, which was implemented in the Abbasid state as a reference or legal code for the administration’s collection and management of funds. This pertains to the field of economic systems.

Educational Policy

In the field of educational policy, we all know that the educational policy of the Islamic state was founded on giving people an Islamic upbringing, so that it would produce Islamic personalities and Islamic culture would predominate in society, giving that society its Islamic identity. Students therefore studied, as their primary subjects, the sciences of the Qur’an and Sunnah and what arose from them: fiqh, hadith science, tafsir, usul al-fiqh and so forth.

Thus, the foundation of education was that it adhered to an Islamic educational policy; naturally, the Islamic state also prioritised teaching material sciences and experimental sciences—fields essential for easing people’s lives and addressing their needs.

It is well known that, during the Abbasid era and also at the state’s frontiers in Al-Andalus and elsewhere, the Islamic state reached such a level of advancement in civilisation, science, technology and invention that it rivalled all the nations of the world. Young people and students came from Europe to Muslim lands—in Al-Andalus, Cairo and Baghdad—to study the sciences. Many returned to their own countries influenced by the Muslims, peppering their speech with Arabic expressions and trying to dress like Muslims. This provoked the clergy in the West, some of whom issued decrees of excommunication against anyone who used Arabic expressions or dressed in Islamic clothing.

The Islamic state excelled in culture and knowledge beyond any other nation; yet more critically, its educational policy was an Islamic one, designed to cultivate in the youth a personality committed to living by Islam. This pertains to the field of educational policy.

Foreign Policy

As for foreign policy, it is well known that Islam’s foreign policy is founded on carrying the Islamic da’wah as a message to the world. One of its most prominent features was that Islamic fiqh divided the world into the Abode of Islam and the Abode of disbelief, and the Islamic state dealt with lands and countries on this basis. It is also well known that, throughout most—indeed all—of Islamic history, the Islamic state’s relationship with other states was based on its obligation to continue carrying the da’wah abroad and engaging in jihad until the rest of the world was transformed from the Abode of disbelief into the Abode of Islam, so that the Islamic Shari’ah would be established. This is the practical method for carrying Islam as a message to the world.

From this point, the Islamic state expanded east and west until it reached the walls of China and the frontiers of India. Indeed, it reached deep into India in the east, and later reached the Pacific Ocean, with Islam reaching Indonesia and those lands. To the west, the Islamic state reached the Atlantic Ocean and entered Europe from the west. The Islamic conquests reached the frontiers of France and then, during the Ottoman State, reached Central Europe. A large part of the European lands thereby became part of the Abode of Islam, as did many lands in Africa, and so forth.

All this fell under the heading of foreign policy in Islam—a system built upon conveying the Islamic message to the world. This principle is well-documented in Islamic jurisprudence; anyone may consult its books to find detailed rulings on external relations, including matters of war and peace, treaties, treatment of prisoners of war, and how lands were governed. It also outlines the legal status of protected non-Muslim citizens (ahl al-dhimmah) in territories that entered the Abode of Islam without their inhabitants embracing Islam.

It took care of their affairs. The Islamic state opened lands without compelling people to embrace Islam, and took care of the affairs of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. All of this was detailed in the books of fiqh to a degree unknown in any other legislation in the world, because the concept of protected non-Muslim citizens (ahl al-dhimmah) simply did not exist in other legal systems. There were only citizens who followed the king’s religion, or groups and citizens treated as second class if they did not follow it. Islam knew neither first-class nor second-class citizens, nor the concept of minorities within the Islamic state. Rather, the Islamic state applied Islam to everyone without exception, took care of everyone’s affairs without exception and spent on all its subjects without exception.

At the same time, however, it left the followers of other religions to practise their rituals and did not compel them to embrace Islam, because:

﴿ لَآ إِكْرَاهَ فِى ٱلدِّينِ ﴾
‘There is no compulsion in religion.’ [2:256]

It left them to practise their rituals: do not interfere with their places of worship; do not interfere with their food; do not forbid them the foods and drinks that are forbidden to Muslims; and do not interfere with what is called their personal status. They marry, divorce, engage in riba and inherit according to their religion. These detailed rulings were entirely unknown to other nations. They are a pure product of revelation from Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He, embodied in the Book and the Sunnah.

The Islamic Ruling System

Regarding the ruling system, this is the issue they cite to claim that Islam was only implemented during the lifetime of the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Where do they derive this conclusion? They argue that electing a Khaleefah through Shoora, followed by receiving the bai’ah after consultation—whereby the people of influence and representation (ahl al-hall wa-al-‘aqd) pledge allegiance to the Khaleefah—ended with the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Thereafter, succession passed from father to son or brother to brother, until it became hereditary from one Khaleefah to another, leading them to assert that Islam’s ruling system had ceased. This is an extreme oversimplification, for the ruling system in Islam does not reduce itself to the mere matter of the Khaleefah’s bai’ah—especially when viewed through their own distorted interpretation of this issue. Here lies perhaps the most critical point of our discussion today: with Allah is all success.

The ruling system in Islam cannot be summarised by the election of a Khaleefah alone; rather, electing a Khaleefah is one aspect among many rulings pertaining to the Islamic governing system. We need not elaborate further at this moment—it suffices to say that for such a system to remain truly Islamic and Shari’ah-based, it must uphold the foundational principles on which Islam’s ruling system was established.

The Four Rules of the Ruling System

The four foundations without which the system cannot be Islamic are: first, sovereignty belongs to the Shari’ah; second, authority belongs to the Ummah; third, appointing one Khaleefah for the Muslims is obligatory; and fourth, the Khaleefah alone has the right to adopt ijtihadi Shari’ah legal rulings and administrative laws. If these foundations are present in a ruling system, that ruling system is Islamic. Let us therefore take the first, then the second, the third and the fourth.

The first principle is that sovereignty belongs to the Shari’ah. This means that in an Islamic state, no system or law may exist except what is derived from the Book and the Sunnah—that is, the sole authority to legislate for the Islamic state lies with the Shari’ah itself. There is no sovereignty of the Ummah, nor does the people have any right to choose laws or legislation; these are democracy and man-made laws. In Islam, however, all laws and legal rulings originate from Allah, Glorified be He. The Islamic state did not derive its legal system, nor did its ruler derive the state’s legal framework, except from the Book and the Sunnah through jurists who were entrusted with extracting Shari’ah legal rulings from them in accordance with their guidance. It was an Islamic state because it applied nothing but Islam’s systems. This is the first principle.

The second principle is that authority belongs to the Ummah. The meaning of this is that the right to choose the Khaleefah—the head of the Islamic state—belongs exclusively to the Ummah. Naturally, those who act on behalf of the Ummah in selecting its leader are the people known in Islamic jurisprudence and history as ahl al-hall wa-al-‘aqd (the people of influence and representation).

For example, the Companions in Madinah—and sometimes senior Companions—would undertake the task of selecting who would succeed the Khaleefah after another, at a time when the Islamic state was vast. Why? Because no two Muslims in the world would dispute that the Companions of Madinah represented them in all matters. After the death of the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace, the Muslims gathered in the portico of Banu Sa‘adah—the Muhajirun and the Ansar—argued, deliberated, and their debate intensified until they settled on choosing Abu Bakr. He was then pledged allegiance to as Khaleefah through Shoora (consultation). He did not assume this position by a bequest from the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace, nor through any religious or traditional status, nor by personal prestige he had acquired. Rather, the senior Companions—those who represented the Ummah—gathered, elected Abu Bakr, chose him, and pledged allegiance to him.

Before Abu Bakr died, may Allah be pleased with him, the senior Companions from Madinah asked and firmly urged him to choose a successor for them before his death. After obtaining their commitment that they would accept whomever he chose, he selected Umar ibn al-Khattab, and they accepted him. This too was consultation among the Muslims from the Companions. When Abu Bakr died, may Allah be pleased with him, Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, received the bai’ah for the Khilafah and thereby became Khaleefah.

When Umar ibn al-Khattab may Allah be pleased with him was fatally wounded, he refused—despite the insistence of the Companions—to choose a successor for them. Instead, he said: ‘The six remaining among those promised Paradise shall choose one from among themselves.’ They gathered and, after consulting, selected Uthman ibn Affan may Allah be pleased with him, who was then given the bai’ah as Khaleefah.

Uthman ibn Affan may Allah be pleased with him was ultimately killed; that is, his term ended with his death. The people spontaneously gathered around Ali ibn Abi Talib may Allah be pleased with him in the mosque and gave him the bai’ah, which established his Khilafah. After Ali’s killing may Allah be pleased with him, the people rallied to his son al-Hasan and pledged allegiance to him. Al-Hasan then relinquished the Khilafah to Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan in order to end the division within the Islamic Ummah, making Muawiyah the Khaleefah of the Muslims.

From Shoora to the Misapplication of the Bai’ah

Towards the close of his reign—specifically during the later years of Muawiyah’s rule—a deviation emerged. This was not a change to Islam’s ruling system but rather a misapplication of the bai’ah process. What occurred was that, beginning with Muawiyah’s era, Khaleefahs started taking the bai’ah for their sons, brothers, or nephews before death—fully aware that no one could assume the Khilafah without the bai’ah. Yet through misapplication, they began bequeathing it to their descendants. However, none of these individuals became Khaleefahs unless they first obtained the bai’ah from the Muslims’ people of influence and representation.

The Companions initially objected and rejected this, and what happened, happened. Later, many jurists began to give fatwas that, in order to prevent strife and bloodshed, it was preferable to give the bai’ah to the Khaleefah chosen by his predecessor. Thus, whenever a Khaleefah designated the Khaleefah who would follow him and obtained the bai’ah for him, the people of influence and representation would come to give the bai’ah to the new Khaleefah.

This was a grave misapplication of Islam—specifically in applying the ruling system within Islam—but it did not constitute a change to that system. The Khaleefah understood that legitimacy could only come through the bai’ah, and he received it while the Islamic Ummah accepted these individuals and this matter. Perhaps—and most likely—this reflected a concession by the Islamic Ummah from their rightful position, contrary to what they ought to have done. However, since the Ummah’s consent, represented by the people of influence and representation (ahl al-hall wa-al-‘aqd), granted the bai’ah to these Khaleefahs who inherited it, this meant that those Khaleefahs obtained the bai’ah from the Ummah. Thus, their bai’ah was Islamic in nature. This remained a misapplication in how the ruling system functioned—particularly in applying the principle of the bai’ah and assuming authority—but it did not alter the fundamental structure of Islam’s ruling system.

Continuity of the Khilafah and Unity of the Khaleefah

As for everything else, the obligation to appoint one Khaleefah for all Muslims remained established within the Islamic Ummah until the Islamic state was destroyed in 1342 AH, corresponding to 1924 CE, when the now-dead Mustafa Kemal destroyed the State of Islam. Muslims were always eager to have a Khaleefah. Yes, for long periods of Islamic history that Khaleefah did not possess the real authority he ought to have possessed. This too was a defect in implementation, not a change to the ruling system. During the Mamluk era, for example, the Abbasid Khaleefah was merely a symbol who conferred legitimacy upon the Mamluk Sultan. The Mamluk Sultan received authorisation from an Abbasid Khaleefah who had no control even over his own affairs. Yet this in itself showed the Muslims’ adherence to the system of Khilafah and to having one Khaleefah for the Muslims.

Yes, other states arose claiming that they were the Khilafah, such as the state of the Ubaydids, who called themselves the Fatimids in Egypt, and before them the Umayyad state in Al-Andalus, whose rulers assumed the title of Khilafah. But this was a dispute over the Khilafah, not an acceptance that Muslims could have more than one Khaleefah. Some jurists did issue anomalous fatwas permitting more than one Khaleefah when the regions were far apart. Nevertheless, there remained an established Shari’ah ruling, agreed upon by the overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars, that the Muslims must have a Khaleefah, that the Khaleefahs may not be multiple, and that there may be only one Khaleefah. Indeed, because this Shari’ah ruling was upheld, the Islamic state returned to embodying it.

When the Ottoman Khaleefahs assumed the Khilafah after the Mamluk state had been defeated, they restored the Khilafah to its position. The Ottoman Sultan became the Khaleefah who held authority for four centuries, until the now-dead Mustafa Kemal destroyed it.

The Khaleefah alone had the right to adopt Shari’ah legal rulings, based on the Shari’ah maxim: ‘The Imam’s opinion settles disagreement.’ When there was disagreement over matters and several ijtihads on an issue, the head of state had to adopt one of them in order to take care of people’s affairs. This was the Khaleefah’s responsibility. The Khaleefah would declare that the opinion adopted as law in the Islamic state was the ijtihad of a particular mujtahid or a particular ijtihad. There was no legislative authority imposing legislation upon the Islamic state; Islamic legislation alone was adopted. If the jurists differed over a matter, the Khaleefah chose the opinion he considered most correct after consulting the jurists, not the general public.

Research Summary

So, my dear brothers, the Islamic system was implemented, whether that implementation was precise, as it was under a number of the Rightly Guided Khaleefahs and many Khaleefahs who came after them, or whether there was misapplication and error in implementation. Some Khaleefahs encroached upon public funds, some oppressed people, and some misapplied the system, and so forth. There is a vast difference between replacing the system and misapplying it. This is the subject of our episode today.

Islam was implemented—yes, it was implemented for hundreds of years—and no other system was implemented in the Islamic state throughout those hundreds of years. Later, Allah willing, we shall discuss the extent of Islam’s success in creating a genuine Islamic civilisation that gave us—or brought into existence in history—an Islamic society with a distinct identity called Islamic society: the society of Islamic civilisation.

Questions and Discussions

I invoke Allah’s blessings and peace upon the Messenger of Allah, his family, his Companions and those loyal to him. Peace be upon you and Allah’s mercy and blessings. Peace be upon you and Allah’s mercy and blessings. Welcome once again as we answer the questions you sent during Halaqa Online.

Administrative laws and systems of life

Brother al-Abid asks: One might say that, although Muslims implemented Islamic systems in past eras, this was because no other systems suitable for managing human affairs existed. Today, however, after the adoption of the Charter of Human Rights and the development of human knowledge, many administrative laws exist that did not exist before and that make people’s lives easier in a better way.

My dear brother, we are not initially speaking about administrative laws—the laws concerning registers, departments, and the formal organisation of transactions. Umar ibn al-Khattab may Allah be pleased with him adopted from the Persians and Romans the system of diwans (departments), which serves as a means for managing affairs and organising records. There is no objection to adopting administrative laws, systems, or forms from anyone, provided they do not contradict what Islam has brought, since these are matters whose original state is permissibility.

The discussion concerns the fundamental systems of life: the ruling system, the economic system, the social system, educational policy, and foreign policy. These are not administrative matters but rather the core systems governing life, society, and the state. Why did Muslims apply Islam instead of other systems? This implies that no alternative existed—yet the opposite is true. Islam emerged in a world already governed by established systems. The Muslim conquests inherited lands from the Roman Empire, renowned for its extensive legislation; even Beirut, conquered during Umar ibn al-Khattab’s may Allah be pleased with him caliphate, was known as the “Mother of Laws,” hosting detailed legislative codes among the Romans. Similarly, Muslims inherited the Byzantine and Persian Empires—ancient civilisations spanning centuries—each possessing intricate systems of governance, economics, and more. Yet these systems were ignored by Muslims. No comparison was made between them and Islamic jurisprudence or Shari’ah.

The issue is not that Muslims found the Islamic Shari’ah more suitable in practice. The issue concerns iman: a believer may not adopt any law other than the Shari’ah of Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He. Allah, the Exalted, says:

﴿ وَمَا كَانَ لِمُؤْمِنٍ وَلَا مُؤْمِنَةٍ إِذَا قَضَى ٱللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُۥٓ أَمْرًا أَن يَكُونَ لَهُمُ ٱلْخِيَرَةُ مِنْ أَمْرِهِمْ ﴾
‘It is not for a believing man or woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, to have any choice in their affair.’ [33:36]

Moreover, Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He, indicated that those who follow the legislation of Taghut while claiming iman merely claim to have iman and follow Satan’s misguidance. Allah, the Exalted, says:

﴿ أَلَمْ تَرَ إِلَى ٱلَّذِينَ يَزْعُمُونَ أَنَّهُمْ ءَامَنُوا۟ بِمَآ أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكَ وَمَآ أُنزِلَ مِن قَبْلِكَ يُرِيدُونَ أَن يَتَحَاكَمُوٓا۟ إِلَى ٱلطَّـٰغُوتِ وَقَدْ أُمِرُوٓا۟ أَن يَكْفُرُوا۟ بِهِۦ وَيُرِيدُ ٱلشَّيْطَـٰنُ أَن يُضِلَّهُمْ ضَلَـٰلًۢا بَعِيدًا ﴾
‘Have you not seen those who claim that they have iman in what has been revealed to you and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer their disputes to Taghut, although they were commanded to reject it; and Satan wishes to lead them far astray.’ [4:60]

The claim that new systems founded on a charter of human rights now exist does not change the fact that these are man-made systems, like every other man-made system at any time in history and in any place in the world. As long as they are man-made laws and systems, they are invalid in Islam’s view. In principle—rationally and intellectually—they are invalid because they were produced by human beings who do not know the reality of the human being, the hidden aspects of his psyche, his instincts and his organic needs well enough to regulate their satisfaction correctly, and consequently to regulate the relationships between people whose purpose is the satisfaction of their needs. I need not even tell you today that reality has proved this system to be a failure, criminal and savage. It is enough for us that Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He, says:

﴿ وَمَنْ أَعْرَضَ عَن ذِكْرِى فَإِنَّ لَهُۥ مَعِيشَةً ضَنكًا ﴾
‘Whoever turns away from My remembrance will have a difficult life.’ [20:124]

And it is enough for us that the Exalted says:

﴿ ٱتَّبِعُوا۟ مَآ أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكُم مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ وَلَا تَتَّبِعُوا۟ مِن دُونِهِۦٓ أَوْلِيَآءَ ﴾
‘Follow what has been revealed to you from your Lord, and do not follow allies besides Him.’ [7:3]

Did the ruling system change after the Rightly Guided Khilafah?

Brother Abu al-Majd, peace be upon you and Allah’s mercy and blessings. And upon you be peace and Allah’s mercy and blessings. My brother Abu al-Majd says: There is no doubt that Islam was implemented in the judiciary and that judgement was not made by anything other than Islam. But was Islam implemented in ruling? The ruling system is the system of Khilafah, while the Messenger called the rule after the Khilafah hereditary monarchy. Why did the Messenger give it this name? This suggests that the Khilafah differs from hereditary monarchy. Did the Khaleefahs implement Islam in ruling—that is, in the system of Khilafah itself?

My dear brother, the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said:

«ثم تكون ملكاً عاضاً»
‘Then it will be hereditary monarchy.’ [Musnad Ahmad 18406; al-Bazzar 2796]

This means that the Khilafah turns into hereditary monarchy: the Khaleefahs treat it as their own possession and cling to it. This describes what the Khilafah would become after the Rightly Guided era; it does not announce a new system to which the Islamic Ummah would be subject. This is shown by his statement, may Allah bless him and grant him peace:

«كانت بنو إسرائيل تسوسهم الأنبياء، كلما هلك نبي خلفه نبي، وإنه لا نبي بعدي، وسيكون خلفاء فيكثرون»
‘The Children of Israel were governed by the prophets. Whenever a prophet died, another prophet succeeded him. There will be no prophet after me, but there will be Khaleefahs and they will be many.’ [Sahih al-Bukhari 3455; Sahih Muslim 1842]

And so forth to the end of the hadith.

The phrase ‘Khaleefahs, and they will be many’ cannot refer to just four or five Khaleefahs—even if we include the fifth, Hasan ibn Ali, may Allah be pleased with him. Four or five cannot be described as ‘many’. ‘There will be Khaleefahs, and they will be many.’ They asked, ‘What do you command us?’ He replied:

«فُوا ببيعة الأول فالأول، وأعطوهم حقهم؛ فإن الله سائلهم عما استرعاهم»
‘Fulfil the bai’ah of the first, then the next, and give them their right. Allah will question them about what He entrusted to them.’ [Sahih al-Bukhari 3455; Sahih Muslim 1842]

This indicates that the Khilafah continued.

However, it came to be characterised as resembling monarchy—meaning that Khaleefahs would seize authority over it, hold onto it, and bequeath it to their sons. Yet this did not imply a change in the ruling system; rather, it meant they misapplied the principle of bai’ah instead of basing it on consultation with the Muslims.

The Khaleefah began claiming he was acting as Abu Bakr had done, and some jurists issued a ruling permitting this. They argued: ‘Yes, Abu Bakr appointed Umar as his successor—so there is no harm in the Khaleefah appointing one after him.’ This reasoning is flawed; the truth is that Abu Bakr did not grant himself the right to designate a successor in his capacity as Khaleefah. Rather, he was entrusted by the Muslims to choose their Khaleefah.

Who delegated this authority to him? The people of influence and representation (ahl al-hall wa-al-‘aqd)—the Companions from among the people of Madinah. These representatives of the Ummah entrusted him with choosing for them, so he chose on their behalf. He did not appoint a successor by his own right—meaning, based on any inherent authority or personal entitlement to designate one. They requested it of him, and he complied with their request. Umar took precautions against this practice, stating: ‘I shall not establish it as a precedent, lest people assume the Khaleefah has an absolute right to appoint successors, thereby depriving them of their own right to choose.’ Thus, anyone claiming that the Khaleefah may designate a successor without consulting the people is mistaken.

What occurred was that Khaleefahs began appointing successors; thereafter, the people would give the bai’ah. Had they refused at that time—as Husayn may Allah be pleased with him did, and as Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr later did—this refusal would have been legitimate, their rightful course of action, and indeed the more correct approach. It was entirely within their rights to reject such appointments and uphold Shoora in selecting the Khaleefah.

Unfortunately, the Ummah then relinquished this right in practice, particularly after the Abbasids carried out their revolution and once again monopolised authority. A kind of despair arose among the Muslims: they feared that demanding the state’s return to Shoora would lead to bloodshed and division among the Muslims.

They therefore said that it was preferable to give the bai’ah to whoever prevailed. This included a Khaleefah who came to office through designation by his predecessor. Since such a Khaleefah received the bai’ah from the people of influence and representation, he was a legitimate Khaleefah.

Yet what actually took place was a misapplication of the bai’ah ruling. Since then, the proper implementation of the bai’ah—one that should be founded upon Shoora—has been abandoned in favour of misapplication. Nevertheless, the structure of the state, its Islamic institutions, and all the powers of the Khaleefah pertaining to Islam’s ruling system—its form, its apparatuses, and every related aspect—remained consistent with the system ordained by Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He, and practiced by the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace.

Hereditary succession and the Ummah’s right to choose

Brother Abu al-Majd asks, may Allah bless you: Is hereditary succession not a usurpation of the Ummah’s right to choose? Indeed, it is. You must have heard my answer in what I presented just a moment ago.

Yes, this was an assault upon the Ummah’s right. Had the Ummah refused it, that would have been its right, and it could have restored that right even through bloodshed, because blood may be sacrificed to ensure the proper implementation of Islam’s system, according to numerous hadiths of the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, concerning the unity of the state and preservation of Islam’s ruling system, and so forth. Yes, what Yazid did was a usurpation of the Ummah’s right concerning the Khilafah. Afterwards, unfortunately, the Ummah relinquished this right and gave the bai’ah, and those Khaleefahs thereby became legitimate.

Evidence for the Four Rules

Brother Wardani asks: What is the evidence for the four principles of the ruling system—the four principles I mentioned? Of course, there are many proofs for them; I shall try to be as concise as possible.

As for the first principle—that sovereignty belongs to the Shari’ah—its evidence is abundant and too numerous to enumerate. Sovereignty belonging to the Shari’ah means that the Lawgiver is Allah, exalted be He. It suffices to cite His words

﴿ إِنِ ٱلْحُكْمُ إِلَّا لِلَّهِ ﴾
‘Judgement belongs to Allah alone.’ [6:57; 12:40; 12:67]

and His saying, glorified be He

﴿ وَمَن لَّمْ يَحْكُم بِمَآ أَنزَلَ ٱللَّهُ فَأُو۟لَـٰٓئِكَ هُمُ ٱلْكَـٰفِرُونَ ﴾
‘Whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed—it is they who are the disbelievers.’ [5:44],

and His statement, exalted be He

﴿ وَمَا كَانَ لِمُؤْمِنٍ وَلَا مُؤْمِنَةٍ إِذَا قَضَى ٱللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُۥٓ أَمْرًا أَن يَكُونَ لَهُمُ ٱلْخِيَرَةُ مِنْ أَمْرِهِمْ ﴾
‘It is not for a believing man or woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, to have any choice in their affair.’ [33:36].

Allah sent down the Book and the Sunnah; revelation came so that people might be judged. It is not permissible for anyone to declare lawful or unlawful—only Allah, exalted be He, has the authority to do so. He says

﴿ ثُمَّ جَعَلْنَـٰكَ عَلَىٰ شَرِيعَةٍ مِّنَ ٱلْأَمْرِ فَٱتَّبِعْهَا وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ أَهْوَآءَ ٱلَّذِينَ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ ﴾
‘Then We set you upon a Shari’ah in the matter; so follow it, and do not follow the desires of those who do not know.’ [45:18].

The evidence proving the obligation of judging by what Allah has revealed—that legislation belongs solely to Him—is too numerous to count.

As for the second principle—that authority belongs to the Ummah—the evidence for this is hadiths from the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace, which clearly demonstrate that those entitled to choose the ruler are the Ummah, represented by the people of influence and representation (ahl al-hall wa-al-‘aqd). The Messenger may Allah bless him and grant him peace did not appoint a successor after himself; instead, he left this matter for the Muslims. They would gather, and from the very beginning, the Sahabah reached consensus that those with the right to choose the ruler were the leading figures of the Ummah acting on its behalf—that is, the Ummah itself holds the right to appoint the Khaleefah.

The hadiths concerning the bai’ah demonstrate this. When he, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said:

«وسيكون خلفاء فيكثرون»
‘There will be Khaleefahs and they will be many.’ [Sahih al-Bukhari 3455; Sahih Muslim 1842]

They asked, ‘What do you command us?’ He replied:

«فُوا ببيعة الأول فالأول»
‘Fulfil the bai’ah of the first, then the next.’ [Sahih al-Bukhari 3455; Sahih Muslim 1842]

The method for electing the ruler is therefore the bai’ah. The bai’ah is a contract by mutual consent between the ruler and the ruled—a contract, meaning that there must be mutual consent between ruler and ruled. The hadiths of the bai’ah show that the method of appointing the ruler is the Ummah’s bai’ah and the Ummah’s choice. Islam contains no other method for appointing the ruler. No body, family or party may say: ‘We possess the right to the Khilafah, and we are the ones who appoint the ruler.’ No. The Companions carried out the appointment on behalf of the Ummah because they were its leading figures and the Ummah would not reject their word. They were its people of influence and representation.

As for the third principle—the obligation to appoint one Khaleefah—the hadiths of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, include in particular his statement:

«إذا بويع لخليفتين فاقتلوا الآخر منهما»
‘If the bai’ah is given to two Khaleefahs, kill the latter of them.’ [Sahih Muslim 1853]

This forbids the existence of more than one head for the Muslims. He also said:

«من جاءكم وأمركم جميع على رجل منكم، من يريد شق عصاكم وتفريق كلمتكم فاضربوا عنقه»
‘If someone comes to you while your authority is united under one man, seeking to break your unity and divide you, strike his neck.’ [See Sahih Muslim 1852]

This makes it clear that the Muslims may not have more than one head: more than one Khaleefah. One Khaleefah must be the head of the entire Islamic Ummah. The scholars agreed on this before some anomalous fatwas appeared permitting more than one Khaleefah if the regions were far apart and communication between them was impossible. In any event, that reality has passed, and today the globe has become what they call a global village.

As for the fourth principle—that the authority to adopt Shari’ah legal rulings and administrative laws belongs exclusively to the Khaleefah—this was the unanimous agreement of the Sahabah.

When Abu Bakr, may Allah be pleased with him, issued rulings based on his own independent legal reasoning, he believed that wealth from spoils should be distributed equally among all Muslims. Umar ibn al-Khattab, however, held a different view: he did not believe in equal distribution between the Muhajirun and Ansar or between those who embraced Islam early and those who came later. Abu Bakr, may Allah be pleased with him, considered three pronouncements of divorce in one sitting as a single pronouncement, so he recorded it as such. Umar ibn al-Khattab disagreed; he viewed the same scenario as three separate pronouncements—an irrevocable divorce. Abu Bakr acted upon his own judgment, binding the state and judges to his ruling, while Umar did likewise with his own views. This continued until jurists declared: ‘The opinion of the Imam resolves disputes; the Imam’s opinion is binding in both outward application and inward conviction.’

In general, this falls under Allah’s statement:

﴿ يَـٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓا۟ أَطِيعُوا۟ ٱللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا۟ ٱلرَّسُولَ وَأُو۟لِى ٱلْأَمْرِ مِنكُمْ ﴾
‘O you who have iman, obey Allah, obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.’ [4:59]

As part of the ruler’s authority, he has the right to adopt, from among the speculative rulings in which jurists have differed, a ruling upon which he relies for taking care of people’s affairs.

Collective obligation and working to establish the Khilafah

Brother Ahmed al-Khadr asks: Has the establishment of the Khilafah become a collective obligation (fard kifayah) because Hizb ut-Tahrir is striving for it? In other words, has this responsibility fallen away from the rest of the Muslims?

In principle, it remains a collective obligation. The effort to establish an Islamic state—the effort to establish the Khilafah—is inherently a collective obligation and continues to be so. However, this does not mean that as long as sufficiency is not achieved, individuals may refrain from this work under the excuse that others are already engaged in it. If we define fard kifayah precisely, it means that if some perform it, the obligation falls away from others. Today, there are those working to establish the Khilafah, yet despite their efforts, the Khilafah has not been established; thus, sufficiency has not been attained. Consequently, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to undertake this work and contribute their efforts toward it, since sufficiency remains unfulfilled. As long as sufficiency is not achieved, sin rests upon everyone who fails to act.

Let us imagine, for example, that returning the greeting of peace is a collective obligation. Returning the greeting is a collective obligation. If fifteen or twenty of us are sitting together and someone enters and says, ‘Peace be upon you,’ what he has done is recommended, but returning the greeting is a collective obligation. This means that everyone need not respond; one person’s response is enough. Suppose everyone remains silent, each waiting for someone else to respond. Everyone says: ‘It is a collective obligation; someone else will do it.’ If no one responds and they delay, they are sinful, because returning the greeting is immediately obligatory. Until the collective obligation is fulfilled, they are all sinful. Delaying this obligation is a sin.

Let us suppose that a person has died in a city or village. The preparation of the deceased—washing him, shrouding him, praying over him and burying him—is a collective obligation (fard kifayah). If some perform it, then for those who did not do so, the duty is discharged. Such tasks are obligatory upon all. If they find that someone is working to fulfil this matter but is unable to complete it, saying, ‘He will eventually carry out this task,’ then preparing the deceased must be done immediately and cannot be delayed. Burial too must be carried out without delay if they see that one or two individuals are engaged in it but are incapable of completing it. In such a case, those who remain are sinful because they observed that the collective obligation was not fulfilled, yet none took action to ensure its completion.

Today, sufficiency has not been achieved. What those currently working to establish the Khilafah are doing is not sufficient, as shown by the fact that sufficiency has not been achieved and the Islamic state has not been established. Had the Ummah responded sufficiently, the Khilafah State would have been established. There are therefore people who have not responded and who withhold and deprive this obligation of their efforts, whether intellectual or practical—through words, writing, speech, action and so forth. Those who are not now working to establish the Khilafah are therefore sinful as long as they know and see—and everyone sees—that sufficiency has not been achieved because the Islamic state has not been established. This does not, however, make it an individual obligation.

It remains a collective obligation (fard kifayah), for when it is fulfilled, those who did not participate beforehand are not told: ‘You failed to discharge your duty; now perform it.’ The Khilafah state has been established and completed through the efforts of those who carried it out. Those who delayed or neglected implementing this collective obligation were sinful, and their sin remains upon them. Yet once fulfilled, they are not commanded: ‘Rise and act now,’ because the obligation has already been met. That is why it is called a collective obligation—if some perform it (however few), then for others, the duty is discharged.

Adoption and Weakness in the Implementation of the Ruling System

Sister Umm Musab al-Khayr says: ‘Peace be upon you.’ And upon you be peace and Allah’s mercy and blessings. Understandings of Islam were multiple during the Umayyad Khilafah, and the Khaleefah did not adopt specific rulings within the ruling system. This helped to empower some rulers and governors, which also affected the state’s strength. How, then, does adoption operate within the ruling system?

The problem is not that the Khaleefahs did not adopt rulings; all the Khaleefahs adopted rulings. No state exists without adoption. All the Khaleefahs practised adoption, and the Islamic state practised adoption. What helped to empower certain rulers and governors is a different matter. Why were some rulers and governors able to secede from the Islamic state from the Abbasid period—indeed, from the late Umayyad period, through the Abbasids and until the end of the Islamic state? There was weakness in implementing the ruling system. The weakness lay in implementation, not adoption.

Naturally, this is a complex issue whose full discussion would take a long time. We can, however, point to an error in implementation, or to actions by the Khaleefahs that were contrary to what was preferable. For example, when a governor is given a long term that lasts many years, this helps him consolidate his personal influence within the province and may enable him to secede or rebel against the Islamic state. The same happens when the means of state power are placed in his hands: command of the army, the treasury of his province and the judiciary. These factors—the long term, possession of an army with which he can rebel, and control of money with which he can become independent—helped governors and princes to rebel and secede. Sometimes their separation was practical rather than formal, if that is the correct expression.

Our master Umar was alert to this aspect and did not prolong a governor’s term of office. That is one point. The Ottoman State lasted six hundred years—six and a quarter centuries—and one of the most important reasons that helped it continue and remain cohesive was its awareness of this matter. It appointed governors for short terms and placed neither the judiciary nor the army in their hands; they had only police forces with which to implement the system. This method adopted by the Ottoman State kept it cohesive for hundreds of years and made it difficult for anyone who wished to rebel against the state to do so. In any event, this is another subject unrelated to ours.

Names of the Ruler: The Khaleefah, the Imam, and the Sultan

Umm Malik al-Dimashqiyyah says: ‘Peace be upon you and Allah’s mercy and blessings.’ As we know, all the texts establishing the obligation to apply the Islamic system use the title Khaleefah for the person who takes charge of the Muslims’ affairs. Today we find many designations—or rather, names, not designations—for rulers, such as king or president. May the person who takes charge of the Muslims be called president or sultan, or does the name not matter, with what matters instead being the ruling system he applies?

A good and pertinent question. The hadiths of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, do not contain only the title Khaleefah. The title occurs in hadiths I mentioned a short while ago:

«إذا بويع لخليفتين فاقتلوا الآخر منهما»
‘If the bai’ah is given to two Khaleefahs, kill the latter of them.’ [Sahih Muslim 1853]

«سيكون خلفاء فيكثرون»
‘There will be Khaleefahs and they will be many.’ [Sahih al-Bukhari 3455; Sahih Muslim 1842]

«عليكم بسنتي وسنة الخلفاء الراشدين المهديين من بعدي، عضوا عليها بالنواجذ»
‘Adhere to my Sunnah and the Sunnah of the Rightly Guided Khaleefahs after me; bite onto it with your molar teeth.’ [Sunan Abi Dawud 4607; Jami’ al-Tirmidhi 2676; Sunan Ibn Majah 42]

And so forth. Hadiths use the title Khaleefah, and they also use the title Imam.

He, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said:

«إنما الإمام جنة، يقاتل من ورائه ويتقى به»
‘The Imam is only a shield; people fight behind him and protect themselves through him.’ [Sahih al-Bukhari 2957; Sahih Muslim 1841]

He also said:

«عليك بجماعة المسلمين وإمامهم»
‘Adhere to the community of the Muslims and their Imam.’ [See Sahih al-Bukhari 3606; Sahih Muslim 1847]

Imam therefore has the same meaning as Khaleefah; Khaleefah and Imam mean the same thing. A hadith of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, also uses the word sultan:

«من خرج من السلطان شبراً فمات، فميتته جاهلية»
‘Whoever withdraws from the sultan’s authority by a handspan and dies, dies a death of Jahiliyyah.’ [Sahih al-Bukhari 7053]

Thus, whether we say Khaleefah or Imam, there is no problem.

The Khaleefah may also be described as the head of state, meaning that he is the ruler. It is not wrong to say that the Khaleefah is the head of state, or that he is… The Companions themselves used more than one expression. One of the well-known expressions used by the noble Companions during the era of the Rightly Guided Khaleefahs, particularly from the time of Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, was Commander of the Faithful. Abu Bakr was initially called the Khaleefah of the Messenger of Allah. Calling Umar ibn al-Khattab ‘the Khaleefah of the Khaleefah of the Messenger of Allah’ was considered cumbersome, so they called him Commander of the Faithful, and this continued thereafter.

There is therefore no problem in using one term or another. If, however, a title refers to a ruling system that contradicts and differs from Islam, it may not be used. The title king is not valid because it denotes a monarchical ruling system in which a ruling family clings to authority, monopolises it and regards it as its right even without the bai’ah; for them, the bai’ah is merely a pledge of obedience. It is therefore impermissible to use king, emperor or chancellor, as in the Austrian or German system. These are all titles that refer to ruling systems other than Islam, so one may not adopt a title that indicates a meaning contrary to Islam.

If, however, a title accords with Islam—such as president, which is an unrestricted term, since the head of state may be called a president—or Commander of the Faithful, commander of the state, and so forth, or Imam, then there is no problem. These expressions occur in the Prophetic hadith. What matters is that the title must not indicate a meaning contrary to what Islam has established.

Blatant kufr and misapplication

Sister A’ishah Zettari, may Allah’s peace and blessings be upon you. Is this misapplication of Islam considered blatant kufr—on the basis of which the Ummah must wage war against the Khaleefah? And if it is not classified as such, what then is the obligation of the Ummah toward the Khaleefah’s misapplication of Islam?

There is a fundamental distinction between blatant kufr and misapplication. Misapplication does occur—indeed, it cannot be imagined as entirely absent—and those who implement it are human beings, not infallible. Infallibility belongs only to the prophets; no one else enjoys such protection besides Allah’s prophets, may Allah bless them and grant them peace. Yet this misapplication varies in degree: from minor errors to grave distortions.

Transforming the Khilafah from the Rightly Guided Khilafah into hereditary monarchy was not a minor misapplication; it was a major one. Likewise, oppressing people and encroaching upon their wealth are major forms of misapplication.

However, as long as the ruler adopts Islam’s system and does not replace it, but merely misapplies it and may oppress people, and so forth, it cannot be said that this ruler has manifested blatant kufr such that people may take up arms against him. That is not permissible.

In a hadith reported from Ubadah ibn al-Samit:

«بايعنا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم على السمع والطاعة في يسرنا وعسرنا، ومنشطنا ومكرهنا، وعلى أثرة علينا؛ وأن لا ننازع الأمر أهله إلا أن تروا كفراً بواحاً عندكم من الله فيه برهان»
‘We gave the bai’ah to the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, to hear and obey in ease and hardship, when willing and unwilling, and when others were preferred over us, and not to dispute authority with those entitled to it unless you see blatant kufr for which you have proof from Allah.’ [Sahih al-Bukhari 7055–7056; Sahih Muslim 1709]

In another hadith, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, spoke of rulers from whom we would see things we recognised and things we rejected [see Sahih Muslim 1854], and of rulers whom the people would curse and who would curse the people. They asked:

«أفلا ننابذهم بالسيف؟» قال: «لا، ما أقاموا فيكم الصلاة»
‘Should we not oppose them with the sword?’ He said: ‘No, as long as they establish prayer among you.’ [Sahih Muslim 1855]

Of course, what is intended here is not merely that he establishes prayer among you. Prayer alone—if he were to neglect zakat or hajj or any other Islamic obligation—would not suffice; rather, the meaning is that he upholds Islam in its entirety. Prayer here is a reference to implementing Islam, as shown by the following hadith of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace:

«اسمعوا وأطيعوا، ولو تأمر عليكم عبد حبشي رأسه كالزبيبة؛ ما أقام فيكم كتاب الله»
‘Listen and obey, even if an Abyssinian slave whose head resembles a raisin is placed in authority over you, as long as he establishes Allah’s Book among you.’ [See Sahih al-Bukhari 693; Jami’ al-Tirmidhi 1706]

In another narration:

«ما قادكم بكتاب الله»
‘As long as he leads you according to Allah’s Book.’ [Sahih Muslim 1838]

That is, so long as he rules by what Allah has revealed.

If he does not rule by what Allah has revealed and instead publicly declares and implements legislation from outside Islam—even if it is just one ruling or one law—he will have openly displayed blatant kufr. For instance, when a ruler states: ‘I have decided to abolish the Islamic ruling system—the Khilafah system—and I believe adopting a democratic system is correct,’ or ‘I have found that the capitalist economic system is superior to the Islamic economic system,’ or ‘We must now adopt foreign policies endorsed by the United Nations Charter and abandon the classification of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr.’ This constitutes blatant kufr. Even if he did not legislate it himself but merely implemented it without conviction, his rule still openly displays blatant kufr.

Even if we do not personally judge him as an apostate or disbeliever—he may be a disbeliever, he may be corrupt, and so on—any ruler who enforces non-Islamic legislation, meaning any ruler who governs by anything other than what Allah has revealed, will have openly displayed blatant kufr in the land. For these are the legislations of kufr: ruling under a capitalist system, ruling under a democratic system, or ruling through man-made laws—all constitute an open display of blatant kufr within the land.

If the state was Islamic and the ruler transformed it in this way, people rise against him with arms and fight him. In the reality in which we live today, however, work must be done to create public opinion for ruling by Islam, and the people of power bear the responsibility of changing the ruler by force and establishing the Islamic state in his place. This is the difference between misapplication and openly ruling by other than what Allah has revealed: implementing non-Islamic rulings in the land and adopting man-made systems. This manifests blatant kufr, and the ruler is therefore opposed and fought.

Divine Appointment or the Bai’ah?

Abu Hafiz Jawad Abu Saneena says: During the Umayyad Khilafah—from Yazid’s era until the last of Banu Uthman’s Caliphs—the Ummah was still governed by what Allah revealed. However, it was a Khilafah of inheritance—that is, rule passed through bai’ah—and this constituted a misapplication in defining that authority belongs to the Ummah. Yes, this is an intervention rather than a question, and yes, Abu Hafiz has articulated the substance of what we said.

Brother Ali al-Qadi asks: If ruling was divinely appointed for a particular person and his descendants after him, how can their claim that the first person entitled to rule did not demand authority be reconciled with the claim made today by members of his lineage that they possess the right to rule? Does this not usurp the Ummah’s right to choose its ruler, and is this not an error by the proponents of this idea? May Allah bless you and benefit others through you. Amin—and you likewise, Allah willing.

Perhaps my brother Ali al-Qadi refers to those who claim that Khaleefahs are not chosen by bai’ah but are instead appointed by Allah, exalted is He. This is the stance of the Imami school—for example, the Twelver Imami school. Regardless of the comment, my brother Ali al-Qadi, we naturally consider this statement to be incorrect.

Allah, exalted is He, and His Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace did not appoint anyone to succeed him in the Khilafah. Had Allah, glorified and exalted be He, appointed someone for the succession of the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace, then the Companions would not have consulted one another regarding who should succeed the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace.

Imam Ali—who is said to be the first of the designated infallible Imams—gave the bai’ah to Abu Bakr, then Umar and then Uthman before the bai’ah came to him. He himself said: ‘This Khilafah came to me.’ This statement appears in Nahj al-Balagha from Imam Ali, or is at least attributed to Imam Ali, and they accept it. He says: ‘It came to me as it came to those before me’—the three before him—meaning that it came to him through the bai’ah. He served as a minister to those before him and was their adviser and helper, and so forth. We are not now going to enter into this issue; if we wished to discuss it in detail, it would take a long time. Our intellectual corpus contains a detailed treatment of it.

Indeed, Allah, exalted is He, did not appoint anyone for the succession of the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace; rather, the selection of successors was entrusted to the bai’ah—a covenant of mutual agreement between the Ummah and its ruler.

Conclusion of the Episode

This appears to be the final question we received for this episode. I thank you for listening attentively and for your contributions and engagement. I ask Allah, Glorified and Exalted is He, to accept from me and from you, and to grant us abundant benefit from these episodes. O Allah, teach us what benefits us, benefit us through what You have taught us, increase us in knowledge, and make our knowledge and deeds sincere for Your Noble Countenance. I invoke Allah’s blessings and peace upon the Messenger of Allah, his family, his Companions and those loyal to him. Peace be upon you and Allah’s mercy and blessings.

In this Halaqa

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