All Halaqaat
EN

Halaqa 16

The Shari’ah Ruling and Its Different Types

About this Halaqa

Full title: The System of Islam — Halaqa 16: The Shari’ah Ruling and Its Different Types

Lecturer: Sheikh Ahmad al-Qasas
Series: Explanation of The System of Islam
Date: 23 October 2017 — 3 Safar 1439 AH

Video with subtitles

Full transcript

Introduction to the topic

Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah be upon you, dear brothers. Welcome to a new episode of your programme, A Halaqa Live, after saying: In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate.

The creed is the foundation of the Islamic personality and Islamic life

In the previous sessions, we discussed the creed from the beginning, going into depth until we reached the subject of qada’ and qadar and the related topics.

Today, we move on to build upon that foundation. Iman—the Islamic creed—is the foundation of the Islamic personality, Islamic thought, Islamic culture, Islamic society, Islamic life, the Islamic State and Islamic civilisation.

Allah, exalted be He, has made the Islamic creed the foundation of a life governed by His commands and prohibitions. It is the foundation for the approved way of living that He has ordained for people.

Belief bears the fruit of adherence to the Shari’ah

Allah Most High says:

﴿ وَٱلْعَصْرِ إِنَّ ٱلْإِنسَـٰنَ لَفِى خُسْرٍ إِلَّا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا۟ وَعَمِلُوا۟ ٱلصَّـٰلِحَـٰتِ وَتَوَاصَوْا۟ بِٱلْحَقِّ وَتَوَاصَوْا۟ بِٱلصَّبْرِ ﴾
‘By time, indeed mankind is in loss, except for those who have believed, done righteous deeds, advised one another to truth and advised one another to patience’ [103:1–3]

Allah Most High says:

﴿ قُلْ إِن كُنتُمْ تُحِبُّونَ ٱللَّهَ فَٱتَّبِعُونِى يُحْبِبْكُمُ ٱللَّهُ وَيَغْفِرْ لَكُمْ ذُنُوبَكُمْ ﴾
‘Say: If you love Allah, then follow me; Allah will love you and forgive you your sins’ [3:31]

Belief must bear fruit. That fruit is complete adherence to Allah’s Shari’ah and a life lived according to the way Allah has legislated for His servants.

Belief is the good word with deep, firmly established roots. It does not merely grow; it continually bears lasting and comprehensive fruit, making the believer adhere to Allah’s commands and prohibitions in every action.

Allah says:

﴿ أَلَمْ تَرَ كَيْفَ ضَرَبَ ٱللَّهُ مَثَلًا كَلِمَةً طَيِّبَةً كَشَجَرَةٍ طَيِّبَةٍ أَصْلُهَا ثَابِتٌ وَفَرْعُهَا فِى ٱلسَّمَآءِ ﴾
‘Have you not considered how Allah presents an example: a good word is like a good tree whose root is firmly fixed and whose branches are in the sky’ [14:24]

﴿ أَصْلُهَا ثَابِتٌ وَفَرْعُهَا فِى ٱلسَّمَآءِ ﴾
‘Its root is firmly fixed and its branches are in the sky’ [14:24]

﴿ تُؤْتِىٓ أُكُلَهَا كُلَّ حِينٍۭ بِإِذْنِ رَبِّهَا ۗ وَيَضْرِبُ ٱللَّهُ ٱلْأَمْثَالَ لِلنَّاسِ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَتَذَكَّرُونَ ﴾
‘It yields its fruit at all times by permission of its Lord, and Allah presents examples for people so that they may take heed’ [14:25].

The commentators said that the good word is belief. Some said that the good word is ‘there is no god but Allah’. The meaning is the same.

The creed is the tree with roots firmly fixed in the earth. What, then, are its fruits? What does it yield?

﴿ تُؤْتِىٓ أُكُلَهَا كُلَّ حِينٍۭ بِإِذْنِ رَبِّهَا ﴾
‘It yields its fruit at all times by permission of its Lord’ [14:25]

Its yield is a life in which the believer adheres to Allah’s Shari’ah and the Ummah adheres to it, producing an Islamic way of life and thus an elevated life that leads people to happiness in both abodes: this world and the Hereafter.

The practical application of belief

What, then, is the practical application of this statement? It is that Allah, exalted be He, has prescribed a Shari’ah for people. It encompasses every aspect of human life and all human actions. There is no human action to which a Shari’ah legal ruling prescribed by Allah, exalted be He, does not apply.

Allah Most High says:

﴿ ثُمَّ جَعَلْنَـٰكَ عَلَىٰ شَرِيعَةٍ مِّنَ ٱلْأَمْرِ فَٱتَّبِعْهَا وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ أَهْوَآءَ ٱلَّذِينَ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ ﴾
‘Then We placed you on an ordained way concerning the matter, so follow it and do not follow the desires of those who do not know’ [45:18]

The meaning of Shari’ah and its comprehensive scope

In its original linguistic usage, shari’ah means the watering place—that is, a spring of water.

It is as though Allah, exalted be He, when naming the system He revealed to humanity—the comprehensive set of Shari’ah legal rulings He legislated for them—called it shari’ah, signifying that it is an inexhaustible source.

Thus, the Shari’ah is the collection of Shari’ah legal rulings that flow from its sources—the Book and the Sunnah, an inexhaustible spring that provides Shari’ah legal rulings for every human action in every time and place.

The completion, perfection and fruit of belief are found in the Muslim’s adherence to Allah’s commands and prohibitions in every action, conducting those actions according to Allah’s Shari’ah. The same applies to the Muslim community, the Islamic Ummah. If the Muslim community adheres to Allah’s commands and prohibitions—that is, to His Shari’ah—it becomes an Islamic society living an Islamic life. Islam’s way of life is then manifested, and this is what is called Islamic civilisation.

From creed to legislation

We now move from the study of the creed and belief to the study of legislation. Today’s subject is the Shari’ah legal ruling.

What constitutes a Shari’ah legal ruling?

A Shari’ah legal ruling is defined as the address of the Legislator concerning people’s actions. A Shari’ah legal ruling is the address of the Legislator concerning people’s actions.

Let us examine this definition word by word.

The Shari’ah legal ruling is what Allah, exalted be He, has addressed to people. As long as we are discussing the legal rulings of Allah, they originate from His address—so whatever Allah, exalted be He, has addressed to His servants constitutes the source of Shari’ah legal rulings.

Had revelation not been sent down to the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, there would have been no Shari’ah legal ruling. Human actions would not have been judged lawful or prohibited, good or bad, praiseworthy or blameworthy.

Human actions were not judged praiseworthy or blameworthy, good or bad, until Allah sent revelation down to His Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.

This is the basis of the Shari’ah legal ruling: Allah’s address is the address of the Legislator.

By the Legislator, we mean Allah—the One who legislates. We therefore take Allah’s address as Shari’ah for us.

The meaning of the Legislator’s address

When we say ‘address of the Legislator’, what is meant is the address of Allah, exalted be He; but scholars—particularly those in the principles of jurisprudence—used the term the Legislator instead of saying ‘the address of Allah’.

This was a precaution to prevent confusion among people, lest they think that what is intended is only the Book of Allah—that is, the Qur’an.

For the address of the Legislator—the address of Allah, exalted be He—is manifested not only in the Qur’an, but also in the Sunnah of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Just as the Qur’an is revelation from Allah Almighty, the Sunnah is likewise revelation from Allah, exalted be He. He, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said: «أَلَا إِنِّي أُوتِيتُ الْكِتَابَ وَمِثْلَهُ مَعَهُ» [Sunan Abi Dawud 4604] — ‘Indeed, I have been given the Book and its like along with it.’

The difference between the Book and the Sunnah of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, is that the Book—the Qur’an—is revelation from Allah in both wording and meaning. Every word and every letter of the Qur’an is revelation from Allah. The meanings and contents of the Sunnah are likewise revelation from Allah, but the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, expressed them in his own words, actions or approvals.

When the scholars of usul and other scholars say that a legal ruling is the address of the Legislator, they use this expression to encompass the Qur’an—the Book of Allah—the Sunnah of the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and what both of them indicate.

The consensus of the Companions and analogical reasoning

The consensus of the Companions is a source of legislation, not because the Companions were legislators. Revelation did not, of course, come to the Companions, and even their consensus was not revelation from Allah, exalted be He.

Rather, Allah, exalted be He, praised the Companions, and they were all upright and trustworthy. Their consensus therefore indicates and proves evidence hidden from us—evidence they saw or heard from the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.

The same applies to analogy: it is the extension of a ruling from an original case to a new case because they share the same effective cause, for which evidence is established in the Book, the Sunnah or the consensus of the Companions.

Thus, the term address of the Legislator encompasses everything that leads to Allah’s revelation: the Book, the Sunnah, or what they indicate.

Why is the definition qualified by “people’s actions”?

The address of the Legislator concerning people’s actions—why does the definition include the phrase ‘concerning people’s actions’?

The address of Allah, exalted be He—whether in the Qur’an, the Sunnah, or what they indicate—encompasses two areas. The first is creed: reports that do not directly concern human actions, such as belief in Allah, His angels, His Books, His messengers, the Last Day and divine decree.

The reports in the Qur’an and Sunnah about the unseen—what has happened, what will happen and so forth—concern assent, which belongs to the heart. As some have expressed it, these are actions of the heart, not actions of the limbs.

These matters belong to the creed. A Shari’ah legal ruling, by contrast, concerns human actions and is therefore defined as the address of the Legislator concerning human actions. What concerns actions is a Shari’ah legal ruling; what concerns assent belongs to the creed or the field of belief.

This definition indicates that if something does not constitute an address from Allah, whether found in the Book or the Sunnah, then it is not a Shari’ah legal ruling.

What some people present to us as fatwas—claiming they are Shari’ah legal rulings—are not based on ‘Allah says’, nor on ‘the Messenger of Allah said’, nor on the consensus of the Companions may Allah be pleased with them all. Instead, they attribute them to public interest, bringing benefit or warding off harm, or to many cases and rational justifications.

This is not a Shari’ah legal ruling. Anything that is not an address from Allah contained in His revelation has no place among the Shari’ah’s rulings; it is not a Shari’ah legal ruling.

No one may declare anything permissible or prohibited, obligatory, recommended, or disliked without relying on Shari’ah evidence found in the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, or what they indicate.

It is true that the Shari’ah came to realise people’s interests, which consist of securing benefits and averting harms. But these interests can be known only through evidence from the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, or what they indicate. What rests on rational reasoning about what the limited human mind regards as securing a benefit or averting a harm is not a Shari’ah legal ruling; it is man-made legislation.

A warning against legislating without evidence

Allah says:

﴿ وَلَا تَقُولُوا۟ لِمَا تَصِفُ أَلْسِنَتُكُمُ ٱلْكَذِبَ هَـٰذَا حَلَـٰلٌ وَهَـٰذَا حَرَامٌ لِّتَفْتَرُوا۟ عَلَى ٱللَّهِ ٱلْكَذِبَ ۚ إِنَّ ٱلَّذِينَ يَفْتَرُونَ عَلَى ٱللَّهِ ٱلْكَذِبَ لَا يُفْلِحُونَ ﴾
‘Do not say, falsely describing with your tongues, ‘This is lawful and this is prohibited,’ thereby fabricating lies against Allah. Those who fabricate lies against Allah will not succeed’ [16:116]

Thus, whoever declares something permissible because they see an interest or benefit in it—or declares something prohibited because they see it as averting harm—is legislating as a human being, not conveying legislation from Allah, exalted be He, unless that declaration rests on detailed evidence from the Book of Allah or the Sunnah of the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.

This is therefore the definition of a Shari’ah legal ruling—the address of the Legislator, meaning the address of Allah concerning the actions of His servants.

What are the Shari’ah legal rulings, my brothers? Having defined the term, what are the Shari’ah legal rulings that apply to people’s actions?

Anyone who surveys the rulings of the Islamic Shari’ah finds that the prescriptive rulings fall into five types.

The first category is the obligatory (fard), also referred to as wajib; below it comes the recommended, sometimes called sunnah, or occasionally nafil or nawafil; then there is the prohibited (haram), also termed mahzur, and the disliked (makruh), which ranks lower than the prohibited in terms of prohibition; finally, there is the permissible (mubah).

Examining the address of the Legislator concerning people’s actions shows that the Shari’ah legal rulings with which Allah, exalted be He, charged His servants are limited to these five categories: the obligatory (fard), the recommended (mandub), the prohibited (haram), the disliked (makruh) and the permissible (mubah). Let us define and explain each one.

The obligatory (fard/wajib)

The obligatory—fard or wajib—is what the Shari’ah commands with a decisive demand. When revealed evidence from the address of the Legislator demands that an action be performed decisively, that action is fard or wajib.

Thus, the obligatory—or fard, by its very nature—is that which the doer is praised for and the one who neglects it is blamed; or that which the one who abandons deserves punishment while the doer deserves reward. This is what constitutes the obligatory.

There are many examples: the obligation of prayer, Hajj, zakat, fasting, honouring one’s parents, truthfulness, trustworthiness, jihad, and ruling by what Allah has revealed. Everything that the Shari’ah commands decisively is fard or wajib: the performer deserves reward and the one who abandons it deserves punishment.

When we say that the Legislator demanded an action decisively, we mean that the command was emphatic and accompanied by an indication showing decisiveness—such as Allah threatening the person who abandons an obligation with punishment.

For instance, when Allah the Exalted says

﴿ مَا سَلَكَكُمْ فِى سَقَرَ ۝ قَالُوا۟ لَمْ نَكُ مِنَ ٱلْمُصَلِّينَ ﴾
‘What brought you into Saqar? They will say: We were not among those who prayed’ [74:42–43].

So when abandoning prayer becomes a cause for entering Hellfire—Saqar—that is an indication that the demand for prayer is decisive. Of course, this is just one example; there are far more examples proving that prayer is obligatory and that its demand is decisive than we could enumerate in this session.

This is the obligatory act: what the Legislator demanded decisively, so that its performer deserves reward and its abandoner deserves punishment.

When the demand to perform an action is non-decisive—the Shari’ah asks for the action without making it binding—the action is called mandub or mustahabb. Types of recommended acts are also called nawafil, the plural of nafila, and jurists sometimes call them Sunnah. A person who leaves such an action is not threatened with punishment.

This is what is known as the recommended act: an action deserving of praise and reward for its performer, while one who abandons it faces no punishment because there was no decisive demand made upon him.

There are many examples: prayers beyond the five prescribed prayers are voluntary, as is fasting beyond Ramadan. Some expiations may make fasting obligatory, while fasting beyond the required amount is voluntary. A second Hajj, a second Umrah, charity beyond zakat and Zakat al-Fitr, reciting the Qur’an, night prayer, glorifying Allah, and abundant remembrance are all voluntary acts.

The Legislator’s demand for it is non-decisive; abandoning it does not incur punishment, nor is the one who abandons it considered a sinner. This is what is recommended: an action for which its performer earns reward and deserves praise, while the one who leaves it off is neither blamed nor punished for abstaining. So this is obligatory and recommended.

The prohibited or forbidden

The third type is that which is prohibited or forbidden—what the Shari’ah absolutely forbids, such that the Legislator warns its perpetrator of punishment. Thus, the doer deserves punishment; yet one who abstains from it may also deserve reward—that is what is haram.

The revealed evidence indicates that the Legislator’s address demands its abandonment in a decisive manner.

There are also many examples of haram or mahzur: killing, riba, zina, theft and disobedience to parents. Allah has prohibited many things. We are not going to enumerate them now, nor could we enumerate them in one session.

Thus, what the Legislator decisively demands to be abandoned is haram.

The disliked (makruh)

Next in rank comes what the Legislator requested to be left alone through a non-decisive demand—what the Legislator requested to be left alone through a non-decisive demand, such that He has only discouraged it with a non-decisive discouragement; thus, its doer is not threatened with punishment. This is makruh—the one who abstains from it is rewarded, while its doer is not punished.

For example, the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace forbade Muslims—he forbade a Muslim who had memorised the Qur’an from forgetting it. The scholars of jurisprudence termed ‘forgetting what one has memorised’—that is, when a Muslim forgets the Qur’an they had committed to memory—as makruh. There was no threat of punishment for those who forgot what they had memorised of the Qur’an, but the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace forbade anyone who had memorised it from forgetting what they had learned. Thus, neglecting to review the Qur’an one has memorised is makruh.

There are matters on which jurists differed when the Wise Legislator prohibited them: some scholars classified certain things as haram, while others classified them as makruh.

Yet in all cases, scholars agree that what the Legislator demanded to be left falls into two categories: one is a decisive demand to leave it—this is the prohibited—and the other is a non-decisive demand to leave it—this is the disliked.

The permissible

These are four types, and the fifth category of Shari’ah legal rulings is the permissible. The permissible refers to what the Legislator has given a choice between taking or leaving, or between doing or abstaining from.

If a Muslim performs an act that is permissible, he remains blameless—neither deserving reward nor punishment. If he also refrains from the permissible, he remains blameless—earning neither reward nor blame.

It should not be said that performing what is permissible earns reward; otherwise it would fall under the category of recommended acts. This is a fifth type where the Legislator has given choice between taking or leaving—so neither the doer nor the abstainer is rewarded or punished.

Is the permissible what the Legislator remained silent about?

Here, an important clarification is necessary regarding what is permissible.

Many people mistakenly believe that what is permissible is simply what the Shari’ah has remained silent about—it did not issue a ruling on it, so its default remains permissibility. This belief, however, is incorrect.

No human action has an original ruling in the absence of Shari’ah evidence. Before the Shari’ah came, a human action had no ruling: neither permissibility nor prohibition, obligation, recommendation, or dislike.

The scholars of Islam who uphold the truth have unanimously agreed that there is no legal ruling before the revelation of the Shari’ah.

This is contrary to the Mu’tazila, who claimed that reason could judge actions to be good or bad before the Shari’ah came.

The ruling for human actions is whatever the Shari’ah has given them. Without Allah’s Shari’ah, human actions have no ruling, including permissibility.

Thus, whatever revealed evidence from the Book and Sunnah indicates as permissible in terms of actions is indeed permissible. However, if there is no Shari’ah evidence confirming that an action is permissible, it cannot be claimed to be permissible—permissibility requires a legal ruling from the Legislator.

The default ruling for things is permissibility

Someone may ask: Is not the Shari’ah principle that the default ruling for things is permissibility? I reply: Yes, it is.

The Shari’ah principle states that the default ruling for things is permissibility. However, two points must be clarified here: Firstly, this principle applies to things themselves—not to actions.

The benefits that Allah, exalted is He, has created for humanity—such as foodstuffs, beverages, clothing, and all other things He has created—the revealed evidence confirms that their default ruling is permissibility.

Allah, exalted is He and free from imperfection, has said:

﴿ خَلَقَ لَكُم مَّا فِى ٱلْأَرْضِ جَمِيعًا ﴾
‘He created for you all that is on the earth’ [2:29].

The revealed evidence also indicates that Allah, exalted is He and free from imperfection, has subjected the heavens and earth—and all they contain—to humanity. And He, exalted is He, has said:

﴿ كُلُوا۟ مِن طَيِّبَـٰتِ مَا رَزَقْنَـٰكُمْ وَٱشْكُرُوا۟ لِلَّهِ ﴾
‘Eat from the good things We have provided for you and be grateful to Allah’ [2:172]

﴿ فَٱمْشُوا۟ فِى مَنَاكِبِهَا وَكُلُوا۟ مِن رِّزْقِهِۦ ﴾
‘So walk among its slopes and eat of His provision’ [67:15]

And He has subjected to you everything on earth [see 45:13].

Convergent evidence demonstrates that everything Allah, exalted is He, has created is permissible for humans. The default ruling for things is permissibility—unless there is a clear indication of prohibition.

There are things that Allah, exalted is He, has prohibited, and this prohibition serves as a specification of the general rule of permissibility—an exception stated by Him in

﴿ حُرِّمَتْ عَلَيْكُمُ ٱلْمَيْتَةُ وَٱلدَّمُ وَلَحْمُ ٱلْخِنزِيرِ وَمَآ أُهِلَّ لِغَيْرِ ٱللَّهِ بِهِۦ ﴾
‘Prohibited to you are carrion, blood, the flesh of swine and that which has been dedicated to other than Allah’ [5:3].

These are the very things that Allah, exalted is He, has forbidden, thus singling them out from the broader principle of permissibility.

Thus, the benefits that Allah, exalted is He, has created carry the default ruling of permissibility for humanity unless there is evidence prohibiting them. Therefore, it is permissible for humans to derive benefit from what Allah has created, as their default status is permissibility—unless a specific prohibition applies.

The default regarding actions is adherence to the Shari’ah ruling

This principle addresses the permissibility of things, and such permissibility is established only by a Shari’ah evidence. These things are not inherently lawful under the Hukm Shar’i before the revelation of the Shari’ah—how could there be a ruling from the Shari’ah prior to its revelation? That is, before the descent of revelation upon the Messenger may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Their permissibility was granted through Shari’ah evidence, such as the proofs we mentioned. However, this principle does not extend to actions; it cannot be said that the default ruling for human actions is permissibility.

﴿ فَوَرَبِّكَ لَنَسْـَٔلَنَّهُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ عَمَّا كَانُوا۟ يَعْمَلُونَ ﴾
‘So by your Lord, We shall surely question them all about what they used to do’ [15:92–93]

Allah, exalted is He, will question the human being about all their deeds—what they were doing, meaning everything they used to do.

﴿ فَوَرَبِّكَ لَنَسْـَٔلَنَّهُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ عَمَّا كَانُوا۟ يَعْمَلُونَ ﴾
‘So by your Lord, We shall surely question them all about what they used to do’ [15:92–93]

Allah, exalted is He, will question the human being about every single one of their actions.

The fundamental point is that a person is responsible for every action and will be questioned about it according to Allah’s ruling. Every human action must therefore have a Shari’ah legal ruling, including permissible actions. The default regarding actions is not permissibility; it is adherence to the Shari’ah legal ruling.

For example, it must not be said that the default ruling for contracts is permissibility. Someone might argue: there is no need to investigate the Shari’ah legal ruling of every contract; it is enough to identify the contracts Allah has prohibited, and all others are permissible. It is permissible, it is permissible—no. The default regarding actions is adherence to the Shari’ah legal ruling, and this includes contracts.

Thus, there is no inherent legal ruling for any contract. We live in an era in which new contracts have arisen, in which new minds have been invented—new contracts that did not exist in the past. Can it be said that their default is permissibility? Of course not. Rather, their default is adherence to the Shari’ah legal ruling.

The Shari’ah encompasses all human actions

Since Allah’s Shari’ah is complete and the Shari’ah evidence encompasses every human action, Allah, exalted be He, sent revelation to His Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, containing Shari’ah legal rulings for every human action. Allah Most High says:

﴿ وَنَزَّلْنَا عَلَيْكَ ٱلْكِتَـٰبَ تِبْيَـٰنًا لِّكُلِّ شَىْءٍ ﴾
‘And We sent down to you the Book as clarification for all things’ [16:89]

The verse clearly indicates that no human action and nothing from which people derive benefit is without a Shari’ah legal ruling.

How? How can a limited number of texts yield Shari’ah legal rulings for new issues that may arise until the Day of Resurrection? That is another subject, and perhaps we will discuss it in another session, Allah willing.

There can be no doubt—and all Muslim scholars agree—that no human action is without a Shari’ah legal ruling. The Book of Allah, the Sunnah of His Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and what they indicate contain evidence for the Shari’ah legal ruling of every human action.

Allah Most High says:

﴿ ٱلْيَوْمَ أَكْمَلْتُ لَكُمْ دِينَكُمْ وَأَتْمَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَتِى وَرَضِيتُ لَكُمُ ٱلْإِسْلَـٰمَ دِينًا ﴾
‘Today I have perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you and approved Islam as your religion’ [5:3]

This is the definition of Shari’ah legal rulings; these are the types of Shari’ah legal rulings.

There is another way to classify Shari’ah legal rulings: those that are definitive in nature, and those that are speculative. Whether Islamic legislation includes both definitive and speculative rulings is a topic best reserved for a dedicated session, so we may remain focused on the current discussion and address the questions raised in this regard.

We shall discuss, Allah willing, in a later session the gradations of legal rulings from the perspective of definitiveness and speculation.

I ask Allah to guide our words and actions, teach us what benefits us, increase us in knowledge, and make our knowledge and actions sincere for His noble sake alone. All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the worlds. May Allah bless our master Muhammad, his family, his Companions and all who follow his guidance with excellence until the Day of Judgement.

Questions and discussion

The first question is from Brother Abu Nizar: ‘Peace be upon you, and Allah’s mercy and blessings. May Allah reward you for this session. May Allah honour you.’

The Hanafi school’s position on obligatory acts (fard) and wajib

My question is: the Hanafis distinguish between fard (obligatory) and wajib (also obligatory but with a different technical classification) in their school—what is your view on that? May Allah reward you, Brother Abu Nizar, with all good.

So here is an additional benefit in this session of ours.

We have stated that the types of Shari’ah legal rulings are five—this is the view held by the majority of Muslim scholars.

Some Muslim scholars—particularly the Hanafis, the school of Imam Abu Hanifah, may Allah have mercy on him—classified the Shari’ah legal rulings into seven types by adding two categories.

He thus introduced a rank between what is obligatory (fard) and what is recommended (mandub), calling it wajib, thereby distinguishing the wajib as lower in rank than the fard but higher than the mandub.

What then of the Hanafīs, with their distinction between what is obligatory (fard) and what is wajib?

The Hanafī scholars may Allah have mercy on them stated that what is obligatory (fard) is that which decisive evidence clearly establishes. Therefore, any Shari’ah legal ruling derived from a decisive proof is fard—it is fard.

The Shari’ah legal ruling derived from speculative evidence is wajib. This is the distinction in terms of the evidence.

As for distinguishing between them in terms of action, they said that when arranging Shari’ah legal rulings—particularly in worship, for example—.

When an obligatory act arises, it becomes one of the pillars of worship; worship cannot be valid without it. If it is among the wajib acts, however, worship remains valid even if omitted.

In terms of reward and punishment, they said that fard and wajib are alike: a person is rewarded for performing either and sins by abandoning either. Just as the performer of a fard is rewarded and the one who abandons it sins, the performer of a wajib is rewarded and the one who abandons it sins.

But in prayer—for example—what is obligatory (fard) within it becomes a pillar of prayer; prayer cannot be valid without it. What is wajib among the legal rulings of prayer: leaving it constitutes sin, but prayer remains valid even if omitted.

The Hanafis, for example, stated that reciting Al-Fatihah in prayer is obligatory—leaving it out incurs sin—but the prayer remains valid without it. If one recites any portion of the Qur’an, the prayer stands; similarly with many other wajib acts within prayer.

The Shafi‘i school regards the pillars of prayer as numerous because everything they consider obligatory (fard) counts as a pillar. In contrast, for the Hanafis, the pillars are limited to what definitive evidence establishes. What non-definitive evidence or other indications point to, the Hanafis classify separately: these are obligations (wajib), and while prayer remains valid without them, abandoning them constitutes sin. Thus, they introduce a category between obligatory (fard) and recommended (mandub).

Prohibitively disliked acts in the Hanafi school

The second type, which the Hanafis place between what is prohibited and disliked, is what they call makruh tahreeman—disliked in the manner of prohibition.

They said: What decisive evidence demands be decisively avoided is haram; what speculative evidence demands be decisively avoided is makruh tahriman.

Thus, in the Hanafi view, both what is prohibited and what is disliked in terms of prohibition are treated equally regarding reward and punishment—that is, the doer of either incurs sin, while the abstainer from them may be rewarded.

The distinction lies in the evidence: if it is decisive, they call the act haram; if it is speculative, they call it makruh tahriman.

We, like the majority, consider this additional Hanafi classification misplaced. The practical consequence of a Shari’ah legal ruling is whether the person who performs or abandons an action is rewarded or punished; when neither the performer nor the one who abstains is rewarded or punished, the action is permissible.

The conclusion is that there are five legal rulings: one category where the doer is rewarded and the leaver is blamed—this is the obligatory or fard; another where the doer is rewarded but the leaver is not blamed—this is the recommended (mandub); a third where both the doer and the leaver are rewarded—this is the prohibited (haram); a fourth where the leaver is rewarded but the doer is not punished—this is the disliked (makruh); and finally one where neither the doer nor the leaver is rewarded or punished—this is the permissible (mubah). This is the detailed breakdown of the additional legal rulings—or types of additional legal rulings—that the Hanafis have introduced.

Differences in classification among mujtahids

A question from Brother Nazeer bin Saleh: Why do mujtahids differ in classifying Shari’ah legal rulings? And does this affect the meaning of the legal ruling—that is, its impact on understanding the address of the Legislator?

Since my noble brother asked here about the classification of Shari’ah legal rulings, I believe I have already answered it in my response—he is not asking about differences within the Shari’ah legal rulings themselves, but rather about how these rulings are classified. I addressed this exact point when responding to Brother Abu Nizar’s question.

Does it have an effect on the meaning of the legal ruling?

Note that the difference, to some extent, is merely formal and terminological. In substance, there are Shari’ah legal rulings that a Muslim must adhere to, which are distributed between reward and punishment, absence of reward, absence of punishment, or complete absence of both.

The command and the imperative form

A question from Brother al-Abid: Are there jurists and scholars of legal theory who share your view that the command indicates obligation or prohibition, or is Sheikh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani alone in holding this opinion?

There is agreement that a command may indicate obligation, recommendation, permissibility, guidance, or other meanings. This is an issue in legal theory.

Specifically, the issue concerns the form of the command and its counterpart, the form of prohibition: what does the grammatical form of a command convey, and what does the grammatical form of prohibition convey?

We must distinguish between the command itself and its grammatical form, as well as between prohibition itself and its grammatical form.

For a command is a demand, and this demand may indicate obligation; it may also indicate recommendation; or at times, permissibility.

As for the imperative form, this is a linguistic term—a grammatical or rhetorical term, so to speak, used by linguists. It is the form ‘do’, and its study is different from the study of the command itself.

Similarly, prohibition may indicate something that is prohibited, or it may indicate something that is disliked. However, the grammatical form of prohibition—that is, a distinct linguistic study—includes structures such as ‘do not do’, ‘avoid doing’, and so forth; in language, this form can convey various meanings.

The same applies to the imperative forms ‘do’ or ‘let him do’: this form may indicate a demand, and it may not indicate a demand.

When the Exalted Allah says to the disbeliever in Hellfire:

﴿ ذُقْ إِنَّكَ أَنتَ ٱلْعَزِيزُ ٱلْكَرِيمُ ﴾
‘Taste! Indeed, you are the mighty, the noble’ [44:49]

This is a linguistic form of demand—what grammarians call an imperative.

This is a technical term used by linguists and differs from what is originally termed in language as command (amr) and prohibition (nahy). In its linguistic origin, the command is simply a request—what is requested—and prohibition is also a form of request: to refrain or desist.

As for what is termed in the science of grammar as the command (amr) and prohibition (nahy) forms—such as ‘do’ or ‘do not do’—this pertains to linguistic analysis.

If the form ‘do’—which grammarians call the imperative form—occurs, what meanings can it carry?

The default ruling for such forms is that they indicate a demand, unless contextual evidence alters their meaning away from being a demand.

If it indicates a demand, contextual evidence must identify the kind of demand: is it decisive, non-decisive, or does it indicate permissibility?

Here, the scholars of legal theory differ on this matter. The question is whether the default ruling for commands is that they carry obligation, recommendation, permissibility, or merely a demand—with evidence then determining their precise classification.

The scholars of legal theory differed on this matter. It is not a new question, nor did Sheikh al-Nabhani introduce a novel opinion about it.

Al-Amidi’s view on the imperative form

For example, among the well-known scholars of legal theory, I recall the words of al-Amidi, may Allah have mercy on him, in his book Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, one of the best-known works on usul al-fiqh.

He states that the imperative form indicates a demand as such. Contextual evidence then directs that demand towards obligation, recommendation, permissibility, subjugation, guidance, or another meaning.

This is a primary topic in legal theory; it is not, in reality, a digression within our subject matter, nor is it the focus of what we are discussing here. It examines the field of usūl al-fiqh.

The relationship between permissible things and acts of utilisation

The brother asks: ‘The default ruling for things is permissibility, but these things are tied to actions—does that not lead us to say that the default regarding actions linked to things is also permissibility until evidence overrides it?’ Is eating garlic and onions an example of this? Yes. May Allah reward you with good.

The address that grants permissibility has a practical implication.

This means that the default ruling for things is that their use is permissible; When foods are described as permissible, this necessarily means that eating those foods is permissible.

If the legal evidence indicates that the default ruling for drinks—which are among things—is permissibility, then this means that the default regarding drinking them is also permissibility.

And if the evidence shows that the default ruling for things—including clothing—is permissibility, then this means that wearing such items—whether wool or cotton and so on—is permissible by default. Everything Allah, exalted is He, has created carries this original permissibility.

When we say that the default ruling for things is permissibility, then it necessarily follows that benefiting from these things is also by default permissible.

However, this does not imply that the default ruling for all actions is permissibility—since some actions are not directly connected to things themselves.

That is why I gave an example of actions when I stated that the default regarding actions is adherence to the Shari’ah legal ruling. What was the example? Contracts. So it cannot be claimed that the default for contracts is permissibility, since contracts are not things.

Even though contracting may involve things, actions or benefits, contracts themselves do not constitute direct enjoyment of those things. Rather, they are actions that arise in transactions between people.

It should therefore not be said—based on the premise that ‘the default ruling for things is permissibility’—that ‘the default regarding actions is permissibility’, because actions are merely deriving benefit from these things; no, they are not.

Direct use of these things includes eating food whose default ruling is permissibility, drinking beverages whose default ruling is permissibility, wearing clothing whose default ruling is permissibility, and using iron and wood to manufacture and ride in cars, travel by aircraft, make devices, and so on. These actions are by default permissible because they are direct uses of things whose default ruling is permissibility.

This does not apply to all actions. For example, it cannot be said that the default ruling for striking is permissibility—since striking is not a form of utilising things. Nor can it be claimed that theft or usury are by default permissible. The default regarding actions is adherence to the Shari’ah legal ruling; there must be evidence proving an action is permissible before it can be considered lawful.

The meaning of what the Legislator remained silent about

Until it may be said to be permissible. A question from my dear brother Wael al-Sultan: The Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said: «الْحَلَالُ مَا أَحَلَّ اللَّهُ فِي كِتَابِهِ، وَالْحَرَامُ مَا حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ فِي كِتَابِهِ، وَمَا سَكَتَ عَنْهُ فَهُوَ مِمَّا عَفَا عَنْهُ» [Jami‘ al-Tirmidhi 1726] — ‘The lawful is what Allah has made lawful in His Book, the prohibited is what Allah has prohibited in His Book, and what He remained silent about is among what He has pardoned.’ Another narration states: «وَسَكَتَ عَنْ أَشْيَاءَ مِنْ غَيْرِ نِسْيَانٍ» [Sunan al-Daraqutni 4396] — ‘And He remained silent about certain things, not out of forgetfulness.’ What is meant by silence here: only things about which He remained silent, or actions as well?

I thank my brother Wail for this question.

Many people invoke this hadith of the Messenger may Allah bless him and grant him peace to claim that whatever the Shari’ah remains silent about—that for which no legal evidence exists—is permissible. This is incorrect, for the default position is that no action lacks a Shari’ah ruling; no Shari’ah ruling lacks evidence; and nothing constitutes a Shari’ah ruling unless supported by evidence.

But they said: Do you not see that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said: «الْحَلَالُ مَا أَحَلَّ اللَّهُ فِي كِتَابِهِ، وَالْحَرَامُ مَا حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ فِي كِتَابِهِ، وَمَا سَكَتَ عَنْهُ فَهُوَ مِمَّا عَفَا عَنْهُ» [Jami‘ al-Tirmidhi 1726] — ‘The lawful is what Allah has made lawful in His Book, the prohibited is what Allah has prohibited in His Book, and what He remained silent about is among what He has pardoned’?

So what is meant here by ‘the Legislator remained silent about things’? It does not mean He did not issue rulings for them; The evidence for this lies in the hadith itself, which states: ‘What is lawful is what Allah has permitted in His Book,’ meaning a text explicitly permitting it.

Here, the intended meaning is that there are aspects of what is permissible that have not been addressed through direct textual permission but rather through indirect means—whether by way of permitting actions or things; whether by way of permitting actions or things. When the Shari’ah came to people, they were already performing actions—actions—or deriving benefit from things. If it approved them and did not prohibit them, that approval and silence about the actions became evidence of their permissibility.

We know that the Sunnah encompasses everything reported from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in the form of words, actions or approvals.

When people did something in the Prophet’s presence, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, within his sight and knowledge, and he remained silent about it, this was his approval. This is an example of the Shari’ah remaining silent: he saw an existing action or use of a thing and did not prohibit it. That silence is Shari’ah evidence that it is permissible.

Accordingly, something that people did before the Shari’ah cannot, for that reason alone, be called permissible. But when the Shari’ah allowed them to continue an action—Allah did not prohibit it and His Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, did not prevent it—the approval was silence about the action, meaning permission for it.

This is what is meant by what the Shari’ah remained silent about. What the Book of Allah was silent about was not explicitly declared permissible—that is, its lawfulness was not stated in words. Some matters were instead permitted through the Prophet’s approval: he saw an action and did not prohibit it, which proved that it was permissible; or he heard a statement and approved it, which proved that the statement was correct; and so on.

To complete the answer to my brother Wael’s question, this applies to both actions and things. Whatever the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, approved when he saw people doing or using it falls under what the Shari’ah remained silent about. It means that the Shari’ah remained silent about prohibiting it, not that it failed to assign it a legal ruling. Silence about its prohibition gave it the ruling of permissibility.

Belief and action

Brother Abu al-Rashid says: Did the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, not say, ‘Iman is what settles in the heart and is confirmed by action’? Why, then, do you distinguish between the creed and the Shari’ah legal ruling?

Firstly, my brother Abu al-Rashid: this is not a hadith of the Messenger may Allah bless him and grant him peace; these words are attributed to one of the Successors—namely Hasan al-Basri. This, in what has been most reliably established, is speech ascribed to Hasan al-Basri may Allah have mercy on him.

He was one of the noble Tabi‘un: «الْإِيمَانُ مَا وَقَرَ فِي الْقَلْبِ وَصَدَّقَهُ الْعَمَلُ» [al-Iman by Ibn Abi Shaybah 93] — ‘Iman is what settles firmly in the heart and is confirmed by action.’

Secondly: why do you differentiate between creed and Shari’ah legal rulings?

We did not invent the distinction between the creed and the Shari’ah legal ruling. It is not a distinction between what is obligatory and what is not, nor does it belong to what was attributed to the Murji’ah.

They say: ‘Disobedience does not benefit … disobedience does not harm alongside belief.’ No, no.

What is meant is that some matters are addressed to the Muslim as matters of assent; their place is the heart, not the limbs. Other matters are addressed to the Muslim regarding deeds and actions.

The former is classified under the creed and the latter under Shari’ah legal rulings. The Muslim is required to uphold both. The distinction is not between something the Muslim must uphold and something he need not uphold.

The believer—the Muslim—is required to believe, to act and to refrain from prohibited acts. He is commanded to believe and forbidden to disbelieve; commanded to perform obligatory acts and to refrain from prohibited acts.

Yet there is another distinction—namely, Whoever abandons belief is a disbeliever and will remain eternally in the Fire of Hell. Whoever does not believe in Allah, His angels, His Books, His messengers, the Last Day and qadar—its good and evil from Allah—is a disbeliever and not a Muslim.

No human deed is accepted by Allah unless it rests upon belief. Prayer, fasting, Hajj, charity and every good action are accepted by Allah only from a person who believes. What, then, is action built upon? Righteous action is built upon belief.

Allah says concerning the disbelievers:

﴿ وَقَدِمْنَآ إِلَىٰ مَا عَمِلُوا۟ مِنْ عَمَلٍ فَجَعَلْنَـٰهُ هَبَآءً مَّنثُورًا ﴾
‘And We shall turn to whatever deeds they did and make them scattered dust’ [25:23]

A person’s deeds are therefore accepted only with belief. Belief is the foundation and the gateway to Islam. Once a person believes, he is obliged to act according to what Allah has legislated.

Note the statement of Allah, the Almighty:

﴿ وَٱلْعَصْرِ ۝ إِنَّ ٱلْإِنسَـٰنَ لَفِى خُسْرٍ ۝ إِلَّا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا۟ وَعَمِلُوا۟ ٱلصَّـٰلِحَـٰتِ ﴾
‘By time, indeed mankind is in loss, except for those who have believed and done righteous deeds’ [103:1–3].

Through belief, a person enters Islam and becomes a Muslim; without it, he is a disbeliever. On the basis of that belief, he is required to perform righteous actions and is rewarded for them, while he incurs sin if he violates the Shari’ah.

Righteous action is therefore built upon belief, and the saying of al-Hasan al-Basri is true: «الْإِيمَانُ مَا وَقَرَ فِي الْقَلْبِ وَصَدَّقَهُ الْعَمَلُ» [al-Iman by Ibn Abi Shaybah 93] — ‘Iman is what settles firmly in the heart and is confirmed by action.’ In other words, action confirms belief.

It must be noted that a person is not said to have lost belief or left its fold whenever he acts wrongly. Failing to act is disobedience; failing to act is a sin.

The difference between disobedience and disbelief

Committing a prohibited act is disobedience, whereas abandoning belief is disbelief.

Whoever contradicts the testimony that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, has disbelieved. Whoever doubts Allah’s existence has disbelieved. Whoever says, ‘I have a preponderant supposition that the Qur’an is Allah’s speech, but not certainty,’ is neither a believer nor a Muslim.

As for one who neglects an obligatory act out of laziness rather than denial—this person is among the transgressors. Their sin may be grave and immense, yet they are not an unbeliever destined to abide eternally in Hellfire.

The exception is an action that itself indicates disbelief, for some actions signify disbelief. But disbelief cannot be declared merely on the basis of any action as such.

For example, someone who deliberately desecrates the mushaf is a disbeliever, because the action dishonours Allah’s Book and speech and therefore contradicts the creed. He disbelieved not simply because he disobeyed, but because he contradicted his belief.

The same applies to someone who insults Allah or His Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. The person has uttered words, and speech is an action. But these words contradict, nullify and remove belief, thereby making the person a disbeliever.

By contrast, someone who commits a sin or neglects an obligation is not said to have lost belief.

Belief is decisive assent based on evidence. As long as a person maintains this decisive assent and does not undermine it through a contrary conviction, doubt about belief, or an action that contradicts belief, he remains a believer.

Even if they commit a sin—for which, as we have mentioned, they may incur blame and punishment—yet they are not among the disbelievers who will remain eternally in Hellfire.

It is therefore necessary to distinguish clearly between belief and action: belief is the foundation, and action is its fruit. Allah accepts no action without the foundation—and what is that foundation? It is belief.

Conclusion

My dear brothers, I ask Allah to make this halaqa beneficial to us and to you. Until we meet in a coming halaqa to continue the subject of the Shari’ah legal ruling, I entrust you to Allah’s care. Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah be upon you.

In this Halaqa

Language and display

Reading language
Subtitles
Text size
Theme
Playback speed
Download SRT subtitles

Copy and share