Introduction
In the name of Allah. All praise is due to Allah. May peace and blessings be upon the Messenger of Allah, his family, his companions, and those who follow them.
Welcome, my noble brothers, to a new episode of your programme Live Session.
In these sessions, which we began several weeks ago, we entered a series centred on how to follow the Shari’ah after finishing the topics concerning the path of faith and related matters. We discussed the Hukm Shar’i, the types of legal ruling and the ranks of legal rulings. In the previous session, we discussed those qualified to derive Shari’ah legal rulings from the Book, the Sunnah and what they indicate: the mujtahids. We explored the subject of ijtihad in some detail.
Episode Topic: When does a mujtahid cease ijtihad?
Today, we turn to a matter concerning mujtahids: when is it permissible or obligatory for a mujtahid to abandon his own opinion in favour of another mujtahid’s?
Ijtihad in Probable Shari’ah Legal Rulings
We previously spoke about the mujtahid who derives a Shari’ah legal ruling after exerting his utmost effort, exhausting his capacity in deriving the ruling and seeking a probable or preponderant view of the Shari’ah ruling on a particular issue.
Naturally, when discussing ijtihad, we are referring to probable Shari’ah legal rulings that admit multiple interpretations—meaning there can be more than one understanding of the evidence upon which they are based.
The definite Shari’ah legal rulings derived from texts that do not permit ijtihad or admit more than a single meaning leave no room for ijtihad or disagreement.
One cannot say, for example: Abu Hanifa’s opinion is that prayer is obligatory, while another scholar holds it is not. If someone doubts the obligation of prayer or denies its obligation, they are not a Muslim. The same applies to all definite Shari’ah legal rulings—such as the obligations of fasting, pilgrimage, alms-giving (zakat), and jihad; the prohibition against judging by anything other than what Allah has revealed; and the prohibitions on adultery, theft, and usury.
All these are Shari’ah legal rulings. There are many other definite rulings as well that do not admit ijtihad or disagreement among mujtahids.
Ijtihad applies only to matters derived from texts that admit multiple meanings and interpretations. We have previously provided examples in earlier sessions of Shari’ah legal rulings subject to ijtihad, where mujtahids differed; we also explained the causes of such differences and why a ruling may be probable.
Differences in Ijtihad Legal Rulings
We stated that whatever each mujtahid derives through a valid Shari’ah method is a Shari’ah legal ruling, even if one mujtahid differs from another regarding that ruling. Thus, Abu Hanifa’s view that reciting the Fatihah in prayer is obligatory but not a pillar, and that the follower may not recite the Fatihah behind the imam, is a Shari’ah legal ruling. Al-Shafi‘i’s view that reciting the Fatihah is a pillar without which prayer is invalid, even behind an imam and even if the imam recites aloud, is also a Shari’ah legal ruling. Each is a Shari’ah legal ruling because both were derived from Shari’ah evidence through a valid Shari’ah method.
However, we stated that Allah’s legal ruling is singular; therefore, one of these two rulings alone is correct and accurately reflects the truth. Indeed, Allah, Exalted be He, legislated only one of these two rulings for us. Yet since the texts carry probable indications, one mujtahid arrived at this probable indication while another reached a different probable indication—both were permissible. Thus, each was a Shari’ah legal ruling, and Allah’s correct ruling is indeed one of them.
Since no one can state with certainty that his opinion is correct, the mujtahid’s actual position and statement are: ‘My opinion is correct, though it may be wrong; the opinion of another is wrong, though it may be correct.’
Allah’s Legal Ruling Concerning the Mujtahid
Here, my dear brothers, we must note that whatever a mujtahid derives through ijtihad is Allah’s legal ruling concerning him. Allah’s legal ruling concerning al-Shafi‘i is that reciting the Fatihah is one of the pillars of prayer. Prayer is therefore invalid unless the Fatihah is recited in every rak‘ah, even if a man is praying behind an imam who recites it aloud. This is Allah’s legal ruling concerning al-Shafi‘i and anyone who imitates him.
Allah’s legal ruling regarding Abu Hanifa is that the Fatihah is obligatory but not a pillar, and it is impermissible for the follower to recite it behind the imam—even if the imam reads softly in prayer. Thus, Allah’s legal ruling concerning every mujtahid is whatever conclusion their ijtihad reaches.
However, is it permissible for the mujtahid—after his ijtihad has led him to an opinion or legal ruling and he considers this to be Allah’s ruling upon himself—to abandon his own inquiry in favour of another person’s? This is our topic today.
The original principle is that the mujtahid must adhere to his ijtihad.
The principle is that a mujtahid may not abandon his ijtihad for the ijtihad of another. The issue here is not that Allah, exalted be He, has legislated two opinions and it is permissible for man to choose either; nor that He has chosen between two rulings so that we are permitted to take one or the other without any harm. Therefore, it does not follow that a mujtahid may absolutely abandon his own ijtihad in favour of another’s legal ruling.
No, Allah’s legal ruling on this matter is singular. This concerns an entirely different subject from that of concession and obligation. In matters of concession and obligation, the evidence indicates that the believer has a choice between them—Allah, exalted be He, legislated concession as such and obligation as such.
When mujtahids differ over a Shari’ah legal ruling, one says, ‘This is my ijtihad, and I consider it correct,’ while another says, ‘That is my ijtihad, and I consider it correct.’ One of these two ijtihads must be correct. What a mujtahid reaches through his ijtihad is therefore Allah’s ruling concerning him and those who imitate him. We shall discuss imitation (taqlid) in a later halaqa, Allah willing.
Therefore, it is not permissible for the mujtahid to abandon his own ijtihad in favour of another’s; this is the principle. Yet we know that every rule has an exception. What then is the exception here? When does it apply? And what exempts a mujtahid from the prohibition against leaving his understanding for that of others?
Four cases where a mujtahid abandons his ijtihad.
When may a mujtahid abandon his own ijtihad in order to adopt that of another? We say—with Allah’s success: there are four circumstances.
We shall examine these four circumstances and find that, perhaps in one or two cases, the mujtahid must abandon his ijtihad for that of another; while in the remaining two cases, he is permitted—indeed, it is allowed—to do so.
Moreover, with a different classification of these four circumstances: in some cases, the mujtahid abandons acting upon his own opinion while still retaining the right to express it; whereas in others, he abandons both speaking and acting upon his opinion. We shall now address each case one by one.
Case One: The Emergence of the Strength of Another Evidence
What is the first circumstance in which a mujtahid must abandon his own opinion—his ijtihad—for that of another?
If it becomes established for the mujtahid who has exerted ijtihad in a particular matter—or matters—that his evidence is weak, whereas another opinion and its corresponding ijtihad possess stronger evidence, then what is obligatory here is to follow the stronger evidence.
It is not correct to say that once a mujtahid has performed ijtihad (diligent legal inquiry) and reached a probable Shari’ah ruling, he must thereafter never change his opinion or reconsider it. No—just as his initial ijtihad led him by preponderant opinion to conclude that the correct legal ruling was such-and-such, so too if later evidence establishes for him by preponderant opinion that his previous view was incorrect and another view—whose supporting evidence is now stronger—is more accurate or sounder, then it becomes obligatory upon him to abandon his earlier position and adopt the one whose evidence he has determined to be stronger.
In this case, one may say that the mujtahid does not abandon his opinion for someone else’s; rather, he revises it—forming a new view—and thus remains bound by it in all circumstances.
The Old and New Madhhab of Imam al-Shafi’i
It is well known in the history of Islamic jurisprudence that al-Shafi‘i, may Allah have mercy on him, had two schools: an old school and a new school. Why did al-Shafi‘i have an old school and a new school?
Al-Shafi‘i, may Allah have mercy on him, spent his life reconsidering his opinions and ijtihads and always seeking the stronger evidence. We know that Imam al-Shafi‘i, may Allah have mercy on him, was raised in the school of hadith in Madinah and studied under Imam Malik ibn Anas, may Allah have mercy on him. He therefore belonged to the school of hadith, whose most prominent scholar was Imam Malik, may Allah have mercy on him, one of the founders of the four famous schools.
Imam al-Shafi‘i then broadened his study and reflection. He moved to Iraq and encountered the school known as the school of reasoned opinion: the school of Abu Hanifa, Sufyan al-Thawri and other Iraqi jurists. It was known as the school of reasoned opinion, meaning the school of ijtihad. Malik’s school, may Allah have mercy on him, and similar schools were known as the school of transmitted reports or the school of hadith.
Al-Shafi‘i, may Allah have mercy on him, studied both schools and benefited from both. He developed his own method and no longer followed either Imam Malik’s school or the Iraqi school of reasoned opinion.
It is well known that Imam al-Shafi‘i, may Allah have mercy on him, laid the foundations of his new school. He was the first to record the discipline of usul al-fiqh in his famous book al-Risalah. He also set out rules of usul al-fiqh throughout other books, especially his famous work of fiqh, al-Umm.
It was widely recognised that upon his arrival in Egypt, Imam al-Shafi‘i developed a new legal approach. Why? Because he systematically reviewed the evidence and gained access to further knowledge—specifically, additional hadiths concerning the Prophet may Allah bless him and grant him peace. That period was one of intense hadith collection; thus, he encountered more Prophetic traditions, reassessed the principles of legal derivation, and formalised his methodology in al-Risalah, as mentioned earlier. Consequently, he constructed a novel jurisprudence grounded in fresh study, deeper engagement with evidence, and renewed analysis of those proofs.
The Fallacy of Fiqh Being Influenced by Environment
Let me pause here briefly to address a misconception that has persisted among scholars for some time, unfortunately.
Many students and scholars cite what happened to Imam al-Shafi‘i, may Allah have mercy on him, as evidence that the environment influences a jurist: he had one school before coming to Egypt and a new school after arriving there.
Such claimants—without evidence or hesitation in their judgement—assert that Imam al-Shafi‘i’s jurisprudence was shaped by the environment between Hijaz and Iraq. Then, after moving to Egypt, they argue, it was the people of Egypt or Egyptian society itself that influenced his thinking, producing a jurisprudence aligned with this new reality, this new environment, and this new community in which he lived during his time in Egypt.
My dear brothers, this claim is unworthy of fiqh and unworthy of Imam al-Shafi‘i, the giant of fiqh and usul, may Allah have mercy on him.
Great jurists—those truly eminent scholars, the diligent mujtahids—they are not people whose derivation of Shari’ah legal rulings is swayed by contemporary reality. Reality is never a source for such rulings; it must never influence their extraction in any circumstance.
The legal ruling, the Legislator’s address regarding the deeds of servants—this is the speech of Allah, exalted be He. Jurisprudence knows this fully, and a mujtahid like al-Shafi‘i understands completely: neither environment nor circumstance has any right to influence the derivation of Shari’ah legal rulings.
Thus, reality itself—customs, traditions, or earlier legal systems—has no authority to approach or affect Islamic jurisprudence. For it is Islamic jurisprudence that must mould reality, not the other way around; it is the Shari’ah rulings that should shape society, never be shaped by it.
Correct; new issues may arise in a changing reality that require deriving Shari’ah legal rulings. However, such a ruling must be derived from its legal evidences—the Qur’an, the Sunnah and what they indicate—so that it can be applied to address this reality. The Shari’ah legal ruling treats this reality; it does not allow reality to influence the Shari’ah legal ruling or the mujtahid’s ijtihad.
This is not true under any circumstances. In contemporary terms, it happened—it happened merely by coincidence—that al-Shafi‘i’s new school emerged in Egypt. In Egypt he reconsidered matters, just as he had continually reconsidered his ijtihads before reaching Egypt. He changed his ijtihads according to what became clear to him and according to new evidence that reached him, including hadiths from Allah’s Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. He also reconsidered how he had used the evidence from which he derived his earlier ijtihads. He therefore arrived at new ijtihads. These new ijtihads became Allah’s legal ruling concerning al-Shafi‘i, may Allah have mercy on him, and everyone who imitated him. No one may say, ‘I imitate al-Shafi‘i, but I take his old school rather than his new school.’ As long as you trust al-Shafi‘i, you take Shari’ah legal rulings from him as a mujtahid because you yourself are not qualified for ijtihad and have placed your trust in him. Allah’s legal ruling concerning him is therefore Allah’s legal ruling concerning you when you imitate him. This is not a matter of personal desire or choosing between two opinions. The issue is what is most probably correct. After reconsidering the matter, al-Shafi‘i reached the preponderant opinion that his new school was correct, so it became Allah’s legal ruling concerning him.
Therefore, the first case where a mujtahid must abandon his opinion for another is when it becomes clear to him that his view is weak because its evidence is weak, and he realises that the other ijtihad’s evidence is correct. He then changes his view and moves from one opinion to another.
Case Two: Trusting the Stronger Mujtahid’s Ijtihad
As for the second case where a mujtahid may abandon his own opinion in favour of another, this occurs when he is convinced that such-and-such a person among the mujtahidin possesses stronger ijtihad than himself and that he trusts that individual’s ijtihad more than he trusts his own. This is naturally not a general case nor one that is widespread. The principle is that the mujtahid must trust in his own ijtihad; otherwise, he would not engage in it at all. However, in specific circumstances, he feels deep within himself and becomes convinced that such-and-such an individual possesses stronger legal inquiry than him—and that he trusts this other mujtahid’s effort more than he trusts his own. In this situation, it is permissible for him to abandon his ijtihad in favour of the ijtihad of someone whom he trusts among the mujtahidin and who appears stronger than himself in terms of legal inquiry.
Report on Popular Views of the Companions’ Jurists
What is the evidence for this? The evidence is a hadith narrated by al-Sha‘bi, may Allah have mercy on him, in which he said:
Al-Sha‘bi reported: ‘Six Companions of Allah’s Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, used to issue legal rulings to people: Ibn Mas‘ud, Umar ibn al-Khattab, Ali ibn Abi Talib, Zayd ibn Thabit, Ubayy ibn Ka‘b and Abu Musa.’ Abu Musa here means Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari. May Allah be pleased with them all.
Three of them would set aside their opinions for the opinions of three others. Abdullah—that is, Abdullah ibn Mas‘ud—would set aside his opinion for Umar’s opinion. Abdullah ibn Mas‘ud would set aside his view for Umar’s view, Abu Musa would set aside his view for Ali’s view, and Zayd would set aside his view for Ubayy ibn Ka‘b’s view. [see The Islamic Personality, vol. 1, p. 161].
These great Companions would do this among themselves, in full view of the other Companions. Had it been impermissible, the Companions would have rebuked them for doing so.
Since they were accepted in that practice, this indicates that the Companions reached a tacit consensus permitting a mujtahid to abandon his own ijtihad in favour of another whose ijtihad he trusts.
Therefore, there exists a case where an individual may relinquish his own ijtihad for that of another—provided he believes or trusts the other mujtahid’s ijtihad more than his own in that particular matter.
In this scenario, we say: abandoning one’s opinion and forsaking one’s ijtihad for another’s is permissible—contrasting the first case, where it becomes obligatory because a stronger proof has been established. Here, however, it falls under permissibility rather than obligation. Thus, this constitutes the second case.
Case Three: Gathering the Word of Muslims
The third case is when one seeks to unite Muslims upon a particular opinion for the sake of gathering them together. In such situations, holding firmly to one’s own ijtihad may lead to division among Muslims or prevent their unity. It becomes possible—and indeed preferable—to avoid such discord at least by relinquishing one’s personal view or legal inquiry in favour of another mujtahid’s opinion. One thus abandons their own position out of concern for uniting the Muslim community upon a single stance.
What is the evidence for this? The evidence is what Uthman ibn Affan, may Allah be pleased with him, did when he received the pledge of allegiance before the assembled Companions and the people of Madinah, and with the Companions’ approval. This constituted a tacit consensus (ijma‘ sukuti) among the Companions on the matter.
The Oath of Allegiance to Uthman ibn Affan
The details are as follows. When the Commander of the Faithful, Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, lay on his deathbed, the Companions asked him to appoint a successor. He refused to do what Abu Bakr, may Allah be pleased with him, had done when, acting with authority delegated by the Companions, he chose Umar ibn al-Khattab to be the Caliph of the Muslims after his death.
The Companions wanted to repeat this with Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, after he had been stabbed and lay dying a few days before his death. They said, ‘Choose for us, O Commander of the Faithful. Appoint a successor.’
Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, refused to choose one person. Instead, he restricted the nomination to the six remaining men who had been promised Paradise.
Upon his death, five men gathered; one of them—Talha—was absent on a journey.
Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf, may Allah be pleased with him, withdrew from candidacy after securing the agreement of the other candidates to submit to his choice and accept whoever he selected. He then removed himself from contention entirely and took their pledge that they would follow his decision.
Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf consulted first with the candidates, then with the people of Madinah; all opinions converged between Ali ibn Abi Talib and Uthman ibn Affan—may Allah be pleased with both of them.
After completing his efforts in consultation, he gathered the Muslims—the people of Madinah—in the mosque.
He then called Ali ibn Abi Talib, may Allah be pleased with him, took his hand and said, ‘O Ali, will you pledge to me that you will act according to the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of Allah’s Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and the practice of the two Shaykhs—the practice of Abu Bakr and Umar?’
Ali ibn Abi Talib refused to bind himself or commit to following Abu Bakr’s and Umar’s actions, may Allah be pleased with them both. Instead, he said: ‘I will rule by the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger, and exercise my ijtihad.’ He exerted diligent legal inquiry in matters where Abu Bakr and Umar had done so—but I do not commit to their opinion.
Abd al-Rahman then left Ali and turned instead to Uthman.
In this, Abd al-Rahman saw a means of uniting the Muslims’ position.
When Ali refused, Abd al-Rahman turned to Uthman and asked him, ‘Will you pledge to me that you will act according to the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of Allah’s Messenger and the practice of the two Shaykhs?’ He replied, ‘I pledge.’ Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf then pledged allegiance to Uthman. The Companions gathered and pledged allegiance to Uthman, and Ali, may Allah be pleased with him, made his way through the rows and also pledged allegiance to Uthman. [see The Islamic Personality, vol. 1, pp. 170–171].
This is evidence—from the Companions’ consensus—that it is permissible for a mujtahid to relinquish his own ijtihad in favour of another’s.
The situation arose when there was an effort to unite the Muslims on a single position, particularly regarding the pledge of allegiance for the caliphate and uniting their ranks under one stance.
Here, both Ali’s and Uthman’s positions were approved. This means that a person may adhere to his own ijtihad and not set it aside for another’s, and that, in this situation, he may also set aside his ijtihad for another’s. It was therefore permissible, not obligatory.
Therefore, the third case is this: it is permissible for a mujtahid to abandon his own opinion in favour of another’s ijtihad if the intention is to unite Muslims upon a single view.
Case Four: The Caliph’s Adoption of Legal Rulings
What remains is one final issue—or rather, what is that last case?
When the Caliph of the Muslims—the head of the Islamic state—adopts a particular ijtihad among the various possible legal inquiries. We know that in matters where there are no definite Shari’ah rulings, the Islamic state must rely upon one such probable Shari’ah ruling and require adherence to it from its subjects. This is necessary to ensure proper relations among people within society and to prevent conflicts arising between them.
What Does Not Require State Adoption of Legal Rulings
It is neither appropriate nor necessary for the state—or the Caliph—to adopt an ijtihad concerning how to pray, the rulings of fasting, the rulings on converting something into fasting, the rulings of Hajj, and so on.
The Islamic State should not adopt an ijtihad that compels people in matters of worship generally, though there are exceptions—for these concern human relations, the state’s governance system, or the unity of Muslim speech. However, this does not apply as a general rule.
There are Shari’ah legal rulings where the Islamic State has no need to adopt any particular opinion through ijtihad.
Shari’ah legal rulings governing human relations
However, there are matters related to human relations, the governance system of the Islamic State, its economic system, foreign policy, penal legal rulings, and family social relationships—for example.
Example of Divorce in the Caliphates of Abu Bakr and Umar
During Abu Bakr’s time, may Allah be pleased with him, he had ijtihads whose observance he made binding on the state, the Muslims, the citizens and the judges.
For example, Abu Bakr, may Allah be pleased with him, held that three pronouncements of divorce in one sitting did not count as three divorces but as one. If a man said to his wife in one sitting, ‘You are divorced, you are divorced, you are divorced, you are divorced,’ Abu Bakr, may Allah be pleased with him, held that these did not count as three divorces but as one divorce. The man could therefore take his wife back, return her to him, or marry her again after the waiting period—after the waiting period.
Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, had a different ijtihad. He held that three pronouncements of divorce in one sitting counted as three. If a man said to his wife in one sitting, ‘You are divorced, you are divorced, you are divorced, you are divorced,’ this constituted an irrevocable divorce with major separation. He could not then take his wife back or marry her again, either before or after the waiting period, unless she married another man and that man divorced her or died, and so on.
Abu Bakr adhered to his ijtihad and required the Muslims to adhere to it, so judges during his time ruled according to that opinion. During Umar’s time, may Allah be pleased with him, he adhered to his own ijtihad and required the judges and the people to adhere to it.
Rules of adopting Imam’s legal rulings
This is a matter where it is permissible—and at times, even necessary for the sake of managing public affairs—for the Caliph to adopt one opinion that binds the people.
The scholars have maxims on this: ‘The Imam’s opinion ends the dispute.’ There is also another maxim: ‘The Imam’s opinion is binding outwardly and inwardly.’ And there is a maxim: ‘The Imam may introduce among the rulings what he introduces among judicial decisions’; ‘he may introduce among judicial decisions what he introduces among issues.’
The state must necessarily adopt legal rulings in many matters.
Example of Agricultural Land Lease Agreement
For example, what does the state say about agricultural land? The jurists differed on whether leasing farmland is permissible: can a man lease his own cultivated land to another for use? They disagreed. Some scholars—including al-Shafi’i—ruled that leasing agricultural land is permissible; it is lawful for its owner to lease it. Others, including the Hanafis, ruled that leasing farmland is not permissible. These are two distinct Shari’ah legal rulings, one of which must be correct.
In all circumstances, so long as the Islamic State remains responsible for organising the affairs of its subjects and maintaining sound relations among them, it must adopt Shari’ah legal rulings.
If the Islamic State—whose adopted position is determined by its leader and Caliph—adopts a ruling that agricultural land may not be leased, then it becomes impermissible for people to lease such land, even if their own opinion differs.
Obligation to Act According to the Caliph’s Adopted Rulings
In this case, if the Caliph adopts an opinion—the Imam, head of the Islamic State—and he accepts a particular ijtihad among them, then everyone—including mujtahids—must abandon acting upon their own opinions and instead follow what the Commander of the Faithful has adopted, as well as what the Islamic State has endorsed. Here, abandoning one’s view is an obligation, not merely permissible; this falls under the duty to obey the legitimate authority.
﴿ يَـٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓا۟ أَطِيعُوا۟ ٱللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا۟ ٱلرَّسُولَ وَأُو۟لِى ٱلْأَمْرِ مِنكُمْ ﴾
‘O you who believe, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.’ [4:59]
Thus, compliance with what the Caliph has adopted falls under His, Exalted be He, command to obey the one in authority, meaning the head of the Islamic State.
Abandoning the practice of reasoned opinion is distinct from abandoning its verbal expression.
However, it must be noted here that the mujtahid’s abstention does not mean abandoning his opinion or statement—rather, he refrains from acting upon it.
Let us suppose al-Shafi’i says—and this is reality—that leasing agricultural land is permissible; in my view and according to the ijtihad of al-Shafi’i, such leasing is allowed. If the Caliph then adopts a ruling that it may not be leased, then if al-Shafi’i owns land, he may not lease it—because adherence to the state’s adoption, to the Caliph’s adoption, is obligatory. Practically speaking, he cannot contravene what the state has adopted; yet this does not require him to tell people that the correct opinion is the Caliph’s view. Nor does it prevent him from teaching in scholarly gatherings or writing in his books and articles that the correct opinion is that leasing agricultural land is permissible.
Abandoning ijtihad here means abandoning its application, not abandoning reasoned opinion or speech. He may always urge the state itself to adopt his view and persuade it to abandon its own, for he believes his is correct.
He adheres to reasoned opinion in terms of speech, teaching, and writing, but he commits himself to what the state has adopted as practice. He calls upon people to commit themselves in their deeds and transactions to whatever the state has adopted.
He may not say to people, ‘The Caliph’s opinion is wrong, and I call on you to adhere to his opinion.’ He says, ‘Yes, the opinion adopted by the state is wrong and admits probability, but you must… wrong though it may be right—excuse me.’ He says, ‘The opinion adopted by the Caliph is wrong though it may be right, but all of you—even if you imitate me—must in practice adhere to what the Islamic State has adopted.’
Summary of the Four Cases
Thus, these are the four cases where it is permissible for a mujtahid to abandon his own ijtihad and follow that of another.
We ask Allah, the Exalted, to grant us an Islamic state that resolves disputes, adopts Shari’ah legal rulings in matters regulating human relations, and rescues us from submission to tyrannical rule and man-made systems that have caused hardship for people and led them into decline.
We ask Allah, the Exalted and Most High, to grant us this soon and to assist us in upholding it. Verily, He is the All-Hearing, the Responsive.
Questions and Discussions
I now turn to any questions that may have arisen during this session. In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.
The Legal Ruling for a Muslim on Matters of Disagreement among Mujtahids
Brother Abu Ghazi Al-Zayn, peace and blessings of Allah be upon you; and upon you be peace and blessings of Allah.
May Allah bless you and reward you well. Question: What is the legal ruling for a Muslim regarding matters in which scholars and mujtahids differ, such as the Shari’ah legal rulings on smoking, growing a beard, listening to music, and similar issues where there is disagreement among mujtahids? May Allah bless you and reward you well.
My dear brother, concerning matters in which mujtahids have differed—beyond the examples mentioned in this question—there are many other issues that can serve as illustrations: a Muslim has the right to imitate any mujtahid whose reasoning they trust. If one follows this opinion, they have fulfilled their duty; if another follows a different opinion, they too have fulfilled their duty—that is, adopting the Shari’ah legal ruling from among the mujtahids. In all cases, the topic of imitation (taqlid) will be addressed in our next session, where we shall elaborate upon it with Allah’s permission.
Seeking a fatwa from a scholar who hypocritically obeys rulers
Hajj Hassan asks:
Peace be upon you, and Allah’s peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you. May Allah reward you with good.
My question: What is the legal ruling on following and adopting the ijtihad of some Muslim scholars in specific details of certain fiqh issues?
It appears to be the same question: certain fiqh issues such as prayer, fasting and Shari’ah-compliant clothing, while this scholar… Ah, no, the question is different. This scholar acts hypocritically towards the rulers, does not enjoin what is right or forbid what is wrong in political matters, and sometimes even goes so far as to deny the ruling concerning the Caliphate. May a Muslim adopt his opinions on other matters?
The difference between the mufti and the mujtahid
First, my dear brothers, let us distinguish between a mufti and a mujtahid. A mufti is not necessarily a mujtahid. Every mujtahid is a mufti, but not every mufti is a mujtahid. If a mufti lacks the ability to perform ijtihad, he has no right to say—a mufti who is not qualified for ijtihad has no right to say—‘I have disagreed with every mujtahid, formed a new opinion and now give you a new fatwa based on the developments of the present age,’ or similar nonsense.
Consequently, whether a mufti is among the Sultan’s scholars or not, he may only issue legal rulings based on definite Shari’ah rulings that he has already established knowledge of, or upon the ijtihad of recognised mujtahids who have been attested as qualified for it.
However, if he claims to exercise ijtihad—and perhaps some claim that he possesses certain qualifications for it—yet contradicts Shari’ah legal rulings of the religion, such as when some muftis permitted interest-based loans (as mentioned here), then their fatwas are rejected against them. They will be held accountable and punished by Allah, exalted is He, with severe torment over this.
﴿ فَوَيْلٌ لِّلَّذِينَ يَكْتُبُونَ ٱلْكِتَـٰبَ بِأَيْدِيهِمْ ثُمَّ يَقُولُونَ هَـٰذَا مِنْ عِندِ ٱللَّهِ لِيَشْتَرُوا۟ بِهِۦ ثَمَنًا قَلِيلًا ۖ فَوَيْلٌ لَّهُم مِّمَّا كَتَبَتْ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَوَيْلٌ لَّهُم مِّمَّا يَكْسِبُونَ ﴾
‘So woe to those who write the Book with their own hands and then say, “This is from Allah,” in order to gain a small price from it. Woe to them for what their hands have written, and woe to them for what they earn.’ [2:79]
Whoever issues a legal ruling to rulers regarding interest-based loans under titles such as investment certificates, savings certificates, and the like—none of them are excused for it, nor is anyone else excused by imitating him in this matter.
And if he is among the Sultan’s scholars, then he cannot be trusted at all. Even if one says, ‘What does that muqallid know?’ it suffices to say to the muqallid: you have adopted the opinion of a mufti for the Sultan who rules contrary to what Allah has revealed—so you will not be excused in this matter.
This is the one who issued a ruling permitting interest-based loans and a ruling permitting reconciliation with a Jewish entity. He also ruled that assisting non-Muslims in fighting Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq was permissible. He allowed women or girls to remove their Islamic dress to enter European schools, and he issued rulings permitting judgement by other than what Allah has revealed under the pretext of gradually implementing Shari’ah laws and mixing them with the laws of kufr. Neither those who issue such fatwas nor anyone who follows them can be excused in any way.
Because these are not matters of ijtihad, the definite evidence has established definitive Shari’ah legal rulings that no one may ever contravene under any circumstances.
Does the muqallid follow the mujtahid’s new ijtihad?
My dear brother, Wael Al-Sultan asks: Is it obligatory for a mujtahid to change his earlier opinion to a new one in such a way that this affects the muqallid? Or may the muqallid follow either of these opinions since they both originate from the same mujtahid?
I believe my brother Wa’il sent his question before I could clarify this point. During my speech, I mentioned that if someone imitates Imam al-Shafi’i and becomes aware that he changed his ijtihad, then it is obligatory for them to shift their taqlid from the earlier opinion of al-Shafi’i to his later one—because they adopted his view based on trust in him. Consequently, due to this trust, they must follow where he moved, since his change was based on finding stronger evidence—not out of personal preference or whim.
Yes, it is obligatory upon the muqallid—if he follows a particular mujtahid—to shift to that mujtahid’s new ijtihad if he becomes aware that he has adopted another position.
Legal Rulings on the Method of Establishing Caliphate
Sister Aisha Zatari.
Peace be upon you and Allah’s mercy and blessings. And upon you be peace and Allah’s mercy and blessings.
Is the method of establishing the caliphate that Hizb ut-Tahrir adopts a matter of ijtihad, or is it a definite Shari’ah ruling?
My dear sister, the method of establishing the Caliphate is not one Shari’ah legal ruling. It is a process extending from the initial formation of the party bloc until the establishment of the Islamic State—may Allah, Exalted be He, hasten it. It comprises a collection of Shari’ah legal rulings, including obligations and prohibitions. Its obligations include forming the party bloc, proclaiming the da’wah openly, intellectual struggle and political struggle. Its prohibitions include that the disbeliever must not participate in ruling by other than what Allah has revealed, that one must not appease, and that one must not abandon the word of truth, and so on. This collection of Shari’ah legal rulings forms the method of establishing the Islamic State.
It is neither said that all of them are definite rulings, nor that all of them are probable ones.
Within it are definite rulings—such as the obligation to carry the da’wah, the prohibition of judging by anything other than what Allah has revealed, and the prohibition of appointing a ruler who governs by anything other than what Allah has revealed—and so on.
There are matters that can be described as based on ijtihad. It is not correct to say—it is invalid to claim—that the entire method is definite, nor is it valid to state that the whole method is probable. Whatever is derived from definitive evidence is definitive; whatever is derived from probable evidence is probable. Consequently, disagreement is permissible in matters that are subject to ijtihad.
Are all Muslims mujtahids?
Brother Abdullah Khamees asks:
Could all Muslims be mujtahids under the rule of a Caliphate?
Or would they only be imitators? Of course, it is inconceivable that every Muslim could be a mujtahid. We know that people vary in their abilities—some possess the capacity for ijtihad, while others do not.
Even among the Companions, some asked other Companions for legal rulings. We said there were six; a short while ago, we cited a hadith from al-Sha‘bi, may Allah be pleased with him: ‘Six Companions of Allah’s Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, used to issue legal rulings to people.’ Thus, even during the Companions’ time, some sought fatwas and others issued them.
Scope of Validity for the Imam’s Opinion
Another question from my brother Wael Al-Sultan:
The opinion of the imam is binding both outwardly and inwardly. In which fields of jurisprudence does this principle apply? Does it extend to worships or only transactions? And if an imam adopts a ruling in matters of worship, is that for every legal ruling, or only for some?
I have spoken on this matter before and will now elaborate further upon it.
Terminological Classification of Fiqh Chapters
Firstly, my dear brothers, we must pay attention to the fact that dividing Shari’ah legal rulings into categories is not a division established by the Shari’ah itself. Rather, it is a terminological classification—one that is permissible, of course—but not something introduced by the Shari’ah. The Shari’ah did not divide its legal rulings; it did not categorise them as worships, transactions, or moral qualities. This classification was devised by jurists.
Jurists classified these divisions to facilitate the organisation and reference of fiqh rulings. Consequently, no Shari’ah considerations, divisions, foundational principles, or rules are based on this terminology—no, not at all.
It is incorrect to say that there are specific foundational principles governing worships alone and others governing transactions. Rather, after examining Shari’ah legal rulings—particularly those concerning worships—one might conclude, for example, that the rulings of worships do not admit reasoning because we find them without a stated rationale. However, this is not itself a legal ruling.
Zakat between worships and transactions
This is because there is no Shari’ah evidence specifying what constitutes worships and what does not. To illustrate: zakat is classified as a form of worship by technical definition, yet is it not also part of the Islamic economic system’s legal rulings—that is, a component of transactions? Zakat establishes relationships between people, between one human being and another.
There are those who pay zakat and those who receive it. A Muslim may give his zakat to the poor, or to someone in debt, for jihad in Allah’s cause, to those whose hearts are to be won over, spend it himself directly, or even transfer it to the state, which then determines how it is distributed. In this case, classification does not depend on whether something falls under worships or transactions.
The Criterion for What the State Adopts
The distinction between what the state must adopt and what it need not adopt depends on which relations among people in the Islamic State and Islamic life can proceed properly without adoption, and which can proceed properly only through adoption. Matters that can be left to people without causing problems in society when the Caliph does not adopt a ruling are left to them as they wish. The Caliph and the Islamic State have no reason to impose a particular school regarding prayer, fasting or similar matters on the Muslims. Regarding zakat and its details, however, he may prescribe a particular ruling. Do you not see that Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, suspended the share for those whose hearts were to be reconciled? This was not because Umar ibn al-Khattab had concluded through ijtihad that this category did not exist or was not among the recipients of zakat. Rather, he found that those who received it in the Prophet’s time, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, met the description of those whose hearts were to be reconciled, whereas that description no longer applied to them in his time, so he suspended it. The Caliph may determine who belongs to this category and who does not. He may also decide whether to pay this category in a given year. He may distribute zakat among its eight categories of recipients or give it to some and not others. Zakat need not be distributed to all eight categories. The Caliph chooses what is most appropriate and obligatory in the circumstances.
Therefore, if Muslim relations and societal care cannot proceed correctly without the Caliph’s adoption of a ruling, then it becomes incumbent upon him to adopt it—whether in matters of worships or transactions.
The Unity of the Fasting’s Beginning and End
For example, fasting is one of the worships. It does not befit the Islamic nation to differ over its beginning or end.
Here, no matter how those who disagree may differ—and even if past disagreement was justified regarding whether local times should vary or remain uniform—all jurists, despite their differing views on this matter, have unanimously agreed that if the Caliph adopts a single day for the beginning and end of Ramadan’s month of fasting, then all Muslims must adhere to it.
Thus, one group of Muslims should not fast on one day while another group fasts on a different day; this is within the authority of the Caliph.
Unifying Prayer Times for Adhan
If the Caliph says, ‘I have decided to unify the times of the adhan,’ we know that the jurists differed, for example, over the time of Asr: does it begin when an object’s shadow equals its height, excluding the noon shadow, or including the noon shadow? The jurists differed over the time of Asr in this way.
The state considers it inappropriate for every mosque to issue the call to prayer at different times. Instead, they say: ‘All of you must give the call to prayer for Asr at this specific time,’ and everyone complies.
On What Straightening of Relationships Depends
This concerns public life and relations among people. Where relations cannot proceed properly unless the Caliph adopts a ruling, he must adopt one. During this halaqa, I gave the example of agricultural land.
May agricultural land be leased, or may it not be leased? These are financial and economic relations in which people may have to appear before a judge. If they disagree, the judge rules according to the legal ruling adopted by the Commander of the Faithful.
An example was given in divorce: what Abu Bakr adopted, what Umar adopted, and the issues regarding differences between the Caliphs—matters each adopted are too numerous to enumerate now in this session.
Conclusion
These are the questions we have received up to this moment, my dear brothers. We ask Allah, Exalted be He, to benefit us through what He has taught us, to increase us in knowledge, and to make our knowledge and deeds sincere for His Generous Face. O Allah, we ask You for reward and recompense and ask You to make what we present and will present sincere for His Generous Face. I invoke blessings and peace upon Allah’s Messenger, his family, his Companions and those who follow them. May the peace, mercy and blessings of Allah be upon you.
